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Motivations Behind the Suez Crisis
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the respective reactions of 
the leading governments involved in the Suez Crisis. The thesis seeks to 
discover w hat motivated the Eisenhower adm inistration to react against 
its allies, when they attacked Egypt. The im petus behind the aggression 
of England, France, and Israel is explored as well. Finally, Gamal 
N asser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal and subsequent actions are 
also discussed and analyzed.
The study suggests th a t President Eisenhower believed he had no 
choice b u t to condemn the aggression committed by England, France, 
and Israel. He felt he was forced to support the Egyptian cause because 
the allies’ attack  was unjustified. Nasser had  nationalized the Suez 
Canal, b u t had in no way inhibited passage through the canal. 
Eisenhower believed th a t England, France, and Israel had  injured the 
cause of the w estern world by invading Egypt; he therefore sought to end 
the assau lt as quickly as possible.
Motivations Behind the Suez Crisis
CHAPTER ONE 
I n t r o d u c t i o n  T o  A C r i s i s
Dwight D. Eisenhower was President of, the United S tates during a 
critical period in American foreign relations. Between 1953 and 1961, 
the Eisenhower adm inistration dealt with the perceived Soviet threat, 
using the Cold War ideology of the United States to determ ine policy.
The ideology defined American interests as antithetical to Soviet 
interests. It set E ast against West, Democracy against Communism, and 
American against Russian. During this period the President threatened 
to use nuclear force a t least twice and repeatedly authorized aerial 
espionage in his efforts to contain expansion of Soviet influence.
In m any ways these years formed the core of Cold War doctrine. 
Containm ent and the Domino Theory found their place in each foreign 
policy decision. A regular feature of Eisenhower’s foreign policy was the 
vying for superiority th a t came to characterize A m erican/R ussian 
relations during the following three decades. In military power, 
technological advancem ents, and international influence the United 
S tates worked to gain the upper hand. An obsession with Soviet
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advances, real and imagined, was the hallm ark of the adm inistration. 
Wherever R ussian in trusion was perceived, America was sure to react.
As with any obsession, this ideology pitting US interests against those of 
the USSR often went so far as to ignore principal factors. Unnoticed 
w ent the desires of sm aller countries th a t became entangled in R ussian 
and American foreign policies. The countries in which Soviet advances 
were detected by the Eisenhower adm inistration came to be viewed and 
treated as pawns on a Cold War chessboard to be moved by either the 
United S tates or the Soviet Union. They were not empowered to act as 
individual states, only as representatives of one or the other superpower.
Because of the obsession with counteracting Soviet advances, the 
Eisenhower adm inistration had more th an  its share of foreign crises.
The majority of these critical situations took on a military nature. After 
all, the superpowers vied for control of the world and the m ost basic 
m eans of control was the th rea t and actual use of bru te force. During 
crises, when extremes became the norm, negotiations were reduced to 
th rea ts of force and counter-force.
Princeton Professor Fred I. Greenstein explained in The Hidden 
Hand Presidency, Eisenhower as Leader th a t because of Eisenhower’s 
m ilitary experience around the world, the President m aintained a  keen 
in terest in foreign policy. Greenstein noted th a t Secretary of S tate John  
Foster Dulles "was the publicly visible actor" in foreign affairs while,
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behind the scenes, Eisenhower actually had control over all policy 
decisions. From within the adm inistration, the President’s participation 
during these crises was evident, bu t frequently it was not seen from the 
outside. In day to day diplomacy it was Dulles who appeared to direct 
m ost American foreign policy. Eisenhower carefully concealed his own 
involvement to avoid being the target of any criticism resulting from 
unpopular policies. Yet, given Greenstein’s proof, and the large am ount 
of substan tia ting  evidence th a t has been declassified since his book was 
published, there is no doubt th a t Eisenhower m anaged American foreign 
policy during his adm inistration. Dulles frequently m ay have acted as 
his collaborator, bu t it was the President who was primarily responsible 
for the final decisions.1
As Eisenhower entered office in 1953, he helped force an armistice 
between North and South Korea, putting an end to the three year war 
there. Both 1954 and 1958 saw Com munist Chinese attacks on the 
Nationalist held islands of Quemoy and M atsu. The President dealt with 
these incursions by threatening nuclear repercussions if Mao Tse Tung 
continued his aggression. The Peoples Republic of China halted its 
attacks. In the m inds of American officials all of these events were 
Soviet instigated.
To avoid surprise attacks and help anticipate any moves m ade by 
the Com m unists, it was requisite to keep an eye on Russia. In 1955
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Eisenhower approved U-2 flights over the Soviet Union and other 
E astern  bloc countries to protect against surprise attack. The launch  of 
Sputn ik  on October 4, 1957 prom pted the Eisenhower adm inistration to 
begin work on a satellite with photographic capabilities. Aerial 
reconnaissance came into its own during Eisenhower’s second term.
During th is period the President also m ade less m alignant 
attem pts a t gaining influence an d /o r  control in the far reaches of the 
globe - to protect the world from the Soviet Union. By m eans of foreign 
aid and alliance the S tate D epartm ent sought to improve relations, 
protect against enemy intrusions, and increase US influence around the 
world. In parts  of the Middle East, South E ast Asia, and the Pacific, 
America’s claim was staked.
The situation in the Middle E ast was particularly precarious. 
Between protection of Israel and an in terest in good relations with the 
Arabs, Eisenhower had to m aintain a careful balancing act. Israel 
represented America’s m ost definite ally in the Middle East. It was a 
bastion of Democracy and a foe of Communism. The Arab countries 
were appealing because of the vast source of potential energy under their 
territoiy. The problem was the m utual hostility between Israel and the 
Arabs. Eisenhower tried to walk a fine line and rem ain friendly with 
both areas.
Although m ost of the Arab states had an anti-w estern bent, the
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Eisenhower adm inistration made all attem pts to keep on amiable term s 
with the oil rich Arabs. Eisenhower neither wished to displease those 
controlling the oil nor wanted to see such  an energy source drift into 
Com m unist hands. Simultaneously, he tried to support and protect 
Israel from Arab aggressions.
Keeping the peace became a top priority for the adm inistration.
By avoiding hostilities the problem of allying with Israel against the 
Arabs or vice versa vanished. Also, peaceful relations lessened the 
opportunity for the Soviet Union to infiltrate the area and gain influence. 
Soviet cam paigns to discredit the United S tates included offering the 
USSR as a more benevolent and less controlling option th an  America. If, 
however, there was no dissatisfaction with the United S tates from either 
of the d ispu tan ts - Arabs or Israelis - the USSR had little chance of 
usurp ing  America’s position.
Notwithstanding Eisenhower’s efforts to please all the people all 
the time, some were always disappointed. To the Arabs, Israel was an 
abhorred neighbor th a t was unquestionably allied to the United States. 
No doubt Arab resentm ent and d istrust of the US formed around this 
point. By spouting standard  anti-American propaganda, the Soviet 
Union appeared to sympathize with the Arabs and th u s gained a foot 
hold in the Middle East.
To protect against the spread of further Soviet influence,
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Eisenhower’s adm inistration worked to align Middle E astern  states with 
America. The Baghdad Pact represented one such  effort, b u t only some 
of the Arab countries had signed th a t treaty. Clear of any arrangem ent 
was Egypt, perhaps the m ost powerful non-aligned sta te  in the area and 
a  country led by one of the preem inent twentieth century Arab leaders, 
Colonel Gamal Abd’ul Nasser.
N asser stood at the forefront of a nationalistic wave th a t began 
following World War Two. 1946 had seen a rising degree of national 
fervor directly opposed to the superpow ers’ tendency toward 
m anipulation of third world countries for first world purposes. After the 
Second World War num erous colonies fought for and won their 
independence, reasserting their own cultures and custom s. O ther 
people around the world experienced a renewed sense of shared 
ancestry, ignored prior to the war. Out of this atm osphere was born 
N asser’s vision.
The Egyptian leader wished to unite Middle E astern  Arabs by 
invoking their common traditions and beliefs. Coming to power during 
the early 1950s, Nasser defied Cold War conventions and sought the 
attentions of both the Soviet Union and the United S tates. Attempting to 
m anipulate the m anipulators, he negotiated with both superpowers, to 
the displeasure of each. As America and Russia vied for increased 
influence in Egypt, N asser retained his independence by rem aining non-
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committal. For his efforts he gained acclaim in the Arab world and 
am ong other nationalistically inclined third world countries, b u t little 
approval from the superpowers.
By playing on the US/USSR rivalry, Nasser m anaged to obtain 
several objectives he sought. With help from either America or the Soviet 
Union he was able to rid Egypt of foreign occupational forces, obtain 
loans and grants, buy weapons, and sell wheat. From an American 
perspective, the assistance provided was a m eans of inviting Egypt to 
become an ally of the West. The Soviet Union had approximately the 
sam e objective.
N asser’s tactic worked for only as long as both superpowers were 
willing to tolerate it. By 1956, the patience of Eisenhower and his 
advisors was wearing thin. N asser could not continue to sit on the 
fence. He was getting the best of both worlds free of charge and the 
United S tates was not benefiting from it. Officials were clear th a t 
som ething would have to change. N asser’s all expense paid trip was 
about to end.
In Ju ly  1956, Eisenhower sen t President Nasser the m essage th a t 
his riding the fence would no longer be allowed by cancelling an aid 
package to help build the massive Aswan dam  on the Nile river. In 
retaliation N asser nationalized the Suez Canal, a  waterway depended
s
upon by m uch of the free world as a passage for oil and other precious
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goods. Nasser’s action m arked the beginning of the Suez Canal Crisis.
Instead of pitting E ast against West, the Suez conflict brought the 
West to face itself. The Eisenhower adm inistration and its World War 
Two allies took diametrically opposed positions. The President rejected 
all efforts to forcefully secure the canal from Egyptian control, while 
Great Britain and France saw no choice b u t to reclaim the Suez using 
any m eans.
The United Kingdom and France were prim ary among the nations 
affected by N asser’s seizure. Both had had a  m ajor hand  in running  the 
canal before its nationalization. Both stood to lose large investm ents. 
And, loss of control over the canal would negate British and French 
influence in the Suez ju s t as Nasser desired. Considering these 
prospects, England and France saw no option b u t to resort to an  
aggressive attack  on Egypt - negotiation would not sway Nasser. Joining 
the Anglo-French forces were Israeli troops, whose leaders had  defensive 
reasons of their own for attacking.
President Eisenhower did not allow for violence as an option. He 
repudiated the military action of his W estern allies. In doing so, America 
appeared to side with the Soviet Union. Here was the only time in the 
Eisenhower presidency when the United S tates was a t odds with its 
allies and in seeming accord with its enemies. The allies’ confidence th a t 
such  an  illusion would never be accepted by American officials coaxed
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Britain and France into believing Eisenhower would support their 
aggression despite his contrary statem ents. Such was not the case.
Numerous volumes have discussed varying aspects of the Suez 
Crisis. The basic events of the conflict can be found in any good 
encyclopedia. They are not obscure. The influences acting upon and 
motivations behind decisions m ade by the principal players have not 
been m ade as lucid. Through examination of the words of Eisenhower, 
Dulles, and m any of the other officials caught up  in the crisis of 1 9 5 6 ,1 
will retell the history of the Suez Crisis in an  effort to reveal the motives 
behind the actions of those involved. From private conversations, 
government com munications, public statem ents, memoirs, and diaries 
their thoughts and rationale can be derived and examined. The vital 
considerations th a t guided Eisenhower in his anti-aggression stance 
m ust be explained in order to truly understand  w hat happened in the 
second half of 1956. Likewise it is necessary to investigate those 
influences th a t resulted in Egyptian nationalization of the Suez and 
British, French, and Israeli insistence upon the use of force.
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E N D N O T E S
1. Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency, Eisenhower as 
Leader, (New York: Basic Books, 1982): 87-92.
CHAPTER TWO 
L e a d i n g  U p  T o  T h e  C r i s i s
During the final days of Ju ly  1956, Gamal Nasser, President of 
Egypt, announced to the world his intention to nationalize the Suez 
Canal. The action startled  and infuriated Britain, France, and Israel, all 
of whom depended on passage through the canal for vital commodities, 
especially oil. These countries shortly devised and executed a plan of 
military attack  to reverse N asser’s decision. Ultimately, largely because 
Eisenhower refused to sanction military seizure of the Suez and instead 
directed the m atter to the United Nations, a less violent solution was 
reached through UN negotiation. In November Soviet th rea ts of sending 
volunteers to defend Egypt against the invaders appeared to bring 
pressure for peaceful solution, bu t had  the President not insisted on 
United Nations participation from the beginning of hostilities it was 
improbable th a t a cease fire would have been achieved w ithout m uch 
higher casualties.1 U.N. involvement m eant world opinion and 
diplomatic pressure could be brought to bear on the belligerent forces.
Nasser’s nationalization move was justified as a reaction to
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America’s w ithdrawal on Ju ly  19 of an  offer to aid in the construction of 
the High Aswan Dam on the Nile River.2 W ashington’s original 
willingness to assist in the project was a reaction to an  anticipated 
th rea t of Soviet influence in Egypt. The th rea t had arisen solely through 
America’s refusal to sell weaponry to Egypt, a strategy intended to 
m aintain an arm s balance in the Middle East. That balance was 
between the Arab countries and Israel, which was clearly pro-American. 
The decisions th a t resulted in these actions were based on perceptions of 
Soviet involvement, domestic pressure, rationalizations, and emotional 
reactions. To understand  how the Suez Crisis developed one m ust 
investigate the events th a t led to Nasser’s seizure of the canal.
The events leading toward the Suez Crisis had  begun in February 
1955. At this time Gamal Nasser requested military aid from the United 
S tates. N asser asked th a t America sell 27 million dollars worth of arm s 
to Egypt. In response the United S tates agreed, b u t added the 
stipulation th a t Nasser make full paym ent upon delivery. Aware N asser 
could not do so, the Eisenhower adm inistration had agreed to the deal 
expecting Nasser to reject their term s. Since N asser dropped the subject 
after the American requirem ents were presented, the American guess 
was correct.3
The effective rejection of Nasser’s proposal by America had  its 
consequences. N asser’s failure to obtain arm s from the United S tates
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was probably his prime motivation behind approaching America’s rival.
In Septem ber of 1955 it was revealed by Egyptian officials th a t a 
weapons deal had been m ade between R ussia and  Egypt.4 The weapons 
were to be transported  through Czechoslovakia. Estim ates th a t Egypt 
would receive between 90 and 200 million dollars in arm s from the 
Soviets alarm ed American policy m akers. Because th is am ount 
drastically exceeded the previously considered 27 million dollars in arm s 
from the United States, the Eisenhower adm inistration felt it had to 
respond in order to counteract possible Com m unist influence.5
In his S tate of the Union Address in the first week of Jan u ary  
1956, Eisenhower made reference to the arm s deal, noting th a t "In the 
Middle E ast recent Soviet moves are hardly compatible with the 
reductions of international tension."6 The com m ent hinted a t the 
adm inistration’s concern with the December contact between N asser and 
the Soviet Union. It was a quiet warning to the Soviets th a t selling arm s 
to N asser was bound to provoke American retaliation.
In his memoir. Waging Peace, Eisenhower commented th a t "The 
first evidence of serious Com m unist penetration occurred in the fall of
1955...in w hat has since been called the notorious N asser ’arm s deal.’"7 
Eisenhower continued, noting th a t "when the Soviet Union threatened to 
become actively involved [in the Middle East], the United S tates could no 
longer rem ain a silent partner. We had to step in to counter the weight
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of Soviet power."8 To prevent Soviet intrusion, America had to act.
Eisenhower’s Secretaiy of S tate discussed the direction Middle 
E astern  foreign policy would take in a  com mencement address.
Speaking before the 1956 graduating class of Iowa State, Dulles 
explained America’s next move to neutralize R ussian advances. Dulles 
reported th a t continued foreign aid was the solution. "The im portance of 
th[e] economic part of our peace insurance policy is em phasized by the 
fact th a t the Soviet Union is now pushing its own in terests by m eans of 
credit extended to other countries."9 The R ussians were giving aid, so 
America had to do likewise to ensure W estern - not Com m unist - powers 
influenced and dom inated the Middle East. The financial aid for the 
construction of the Aswan Dam would promote American interests. 
Leonard Mosley, biographer of the Dulles family, noted th a t Dulles 
"maintained th a t a  loan for such a project [as the dam] would 
dem onstrate to the Egyptian people and the world th a t while the 
Russians were in Egypt as m erchants of death [dealing in weapons], 
America was offering the m eans for growth and life."10 The dam  aid 
would ensure America’s position in Egypt.
America needed a tangible response to counter the Soviet intrusion 
into Egypt. Thus, in December of 1955 Nasser was offered economic 
assistance for the construction of the High Aswan Dam. The United 
States, G reat Britain, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
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Development (IBRD) would combine to aid Egypt in financing the dam, 
Terence Robertson commented in his book, Crisis: The Inside Story of 
the Suez Conspiracy that, "the project depended logically on Nasser’s 
willingness to stay away from commitments with the E ast and  become, 
in a  general sense, someone Dulles and [British Prime Minister] Eden 
could p u t down on the credit side of their political ledger."11 The aid was 
designed to m ake Nasser more am enable to W estern interests, bu t would 
only last if Nasser curtailed his association with the East.
Besides a  tactic to gain N asser’s affections and cooperation, the 
proposal reflected the Eisenhower adm inistration’s belief in American 
superiority over Com m unist Russia. American exceptionalism, not a 
recent innovation, was especially prevalent following World War Two and 
th roughout the Eisenhower adm inistration. It followed th a t anything 
obtained from the United S tates would retain a sem blance of th a t 
perfection and be desirable to the receiving country. N asser was sure to 
accept a  loan from the US, no m atter how unappealing the term s. The 
adm inistration apparently had not anticipated th a t Nasser might desire 
a  more beneficial arrangem ent than  the one offered by W ashington and 
the IBRD. Nor had the S tate D epartm ent expected th a t N asser might 
u se  any negotiating tactic he could to try to obtain a better deal. Dulles’ 
stipulations for funding did not represent a p leasant prospect to Nasser, 
so the Egyptian refused to accept them  outright.
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Before the Secretaiy of S tate would endorse the loan for Aswan aid 
he required N asser to agree to various conditions. The m ost insulting of 
them  for N asser m ust have been the one calling for the government of 
Egypt to plan its fiscal year around repaying the debts to its creditors, 
the United S tates, Great Britain, and the IBRD. In addition Dulles
m aintained th a t American officials would oversee this process - to
r )
ensure money was not directed toward alternate purchases by Egyptian 
officials. Regular installm ents would be paid in place of weapons 
purchases from the Soviets. Since construction of the Aswan Dam was 
expected to last ten years, America would have virtual control over the 
Egyptian economy for a decade. This agreem ent was far from beneficial 
to Nasser. In fact, it would have limited N asser’s independent actions 
entirely.12
AAfhile Nasser rejected Dulles’ proposition, the proposal found no 
substan tia l criticism in the United States. The President rem arked th a t 
"The arm s deal went through and our attitude toward Soviet penetration 
naturally  hardened. But we did not cease our efforts to m ake N asser see 
the benefits of his strengthening ties with the west."13 Eisenhower’s 
sta tem ent portrayed Egypt as only a pawn in the game between Soviet 
and  American domination. Like Woodrow Wilson’s attem pt to teach the 
Mexicans good government, Eisenhower planned to show the Egyptians 
the benefits of being a friend to the West. Aswan aid was one possible
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benefit.
N asser preferred to m aintain his own sovereignty, or a t minimum, 
retain enough power to avoid succum bing to the American government’s 
agenda for his country. His acceptance of E astern  bloc arm s had 
displayed th is and American officials could not be comfortable with 
N asser’s unwillingness to stay in line with American wishes. Director for 
the Center of Political Research and Studies a t Cairo University,
Professor Ali E. Hillal Dessouki commented th a t from his ascendance to 
power, Nasser "became increasingly convinced th a t Afro-Asian countries 
m ust avoid alignm ent with great powers. He thought the m ost 
significant fact of the world situation was the Cold War between the two 
blocs. So the best course of action for small nations and Afro-Asian 
countries was to avoid involvement in Cold War politics because it would 
inevitably spell foreign influence."14 At all costs N asser would not allow 
foreign influences in his country.
Nasser, in practice, did not completely follow his own philosophy. 
Instead of rem aining apart from the superpowers, he was involved with 
both the Soviet Union and America. N asser attem pted to m aintain  a 
balance whereby he would not be dependent or beholden to either 
nation, b u t obtained supplies and funds from both. In this game he 
could not succeed because as soon as N asser had contact with either the 
United S tates or Russia, he became a piece in the Cold War chess
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m atch. W hether he considered himself a game piece or not, he was 
treated as such by the Eisenhower adm inistration. Egypt was viewed in 
the light of American versus Soviet interests, not with regard to Egyptian 
goals. N asser could not escape it.
In Eisenhower’s mind, it was an American’s duty, to self and the 
free world, to keep Egypt from falling under Soviet influence - to enforce 
containm ent. The adm inistration’s ideology also required immediate 
suspicion of Egypt’s motivations once a relationship with R ussia had 
been revealed. Thus, the United States attem pted to increase its 
popularity with the Egyptians through boons like the dam, while it 
sim ultaneously rem ained on the look out for negative influences injected 
by the Com munists.
As early as March of the following year the British revealed their 
own suspicions. Along with the United S tates, Great Britain had  agreed 
to help finance the Aswan Dam. By the third week in M arch their desire 
to help had decreased. The British believed th a t Nasser was held in the 
clutches of Soviet power. The 1955 arm s deal had significantly tied 
Egypt to the Soviets. Egypt was now, according to British analysts, 
beholden to the Soviets because they had received weapons. As a result 
Britain began to consider the option of "withdraw!ing] our offer of 
financial assistance over the Aswan Dam."15 Officials within the 
D epartm ent of S tate concurred th a t Soviet influence was present in
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Egypt.
An inter-departm ental memo on March 21, from the Deputy 
Secretary of S tate for Political Affairs to the Under Secretary of State, 
stated  th a t "Nasser had opened the African door to Soviet penetration...." 
and complained th a t "The USSR is sending nuclear scientists to Cairo by 
agreem ent with the Egyptian Government to set up  a research reactor 
laboratory."16 The concern about Soviet connections in Egypt was clear. 
It was not long before America took steps th a t hinted a t their agreem ent 
with the British conclusion to cancel Aswan aid.
On March 28 a United States policy plan called for actions to limit 
Egypt’s influence in the surrounding Middle Eastern  countries of Sudan, 
Libya, Jordan, Yemen, "and other Arabian principalities."17 It was 
believed by policy m akers th a t once tain ted by Com m unist influence, in
i
the form of weapons, Egypt could not be perm itted to influence its peers. 
That would further spread the Com m unist disease.
In addition, the United States began to consider either jam m ing 
Egyptian radio airways or increasing Iraqi radio capacities in order to 
halt anti-American broadcasts em anating from Egypt.18 While N asser’s 
decision to allow anti-American propaganda was ill-advised and provided 
a  reason for the United S tates to d istrust Egypt, it is clear th a t the 
Eisenhower adm inistration already held strong misgivings about their 
Aswan Dam involvement. Nasser had neither curtailed his anti-
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American propaganda, nor term inated his contact with the Soviets. 
Consequently, Eisenhower, Dulles, and several other adm inistration 
advisors concluded th a t the "US will continue to delay current 
negotiations on the High Aswan Dam."19
Once the dam  project was delayed it was never again seriously 
considered. Nasser, refusing to bow to W estern desires continued 
actions th a t clearly displeased the West. On May 16, N asser recognized 
the Com m unist government of China.20 W hat could not help b u t be 
interpreted as a move against the United States, and a move toward the 
Soviet direction, had international as well as domestic ramifications for 
American policy.
Internationally, Egypt had acted in direct opposition to 
Eisenhower’s foreign policy. To associate with a countiy  th a t overtly 
defied America’s objective would not show the United S tates in a good 
fight. How could Eisenhower’s government court N asser when the 
Egyptian leader had  recognized the People’s Republic of China? Egypt, 
from an American perspective, was flaunting its independence. By doing 
so, America appeared ineffective.
Domestically, Egypt’s recognition of PRC, further reduced 
American Congressional support for aid.21 Support for Aswan Dam 
funding was precarious before N asser’s recognition of Com m unist China. 
After, it merely reinforced the Congressional inclination not to
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appropriate the necessary money for the Dam.
A com m entator in Foreign Policy Bulletin noted th a t one reason for 
dislike of the Aswan project "was the outspoken opposition of the 
Congressm en from southern  cotton growing sta tes who feared th a t the 
dam  would increase Egypt’s cotton-producing area, thereby creating new 
competition for the United States."22 Generally, in fact, Congressmen 
from num erous geographic areas were against appropriating funds for 
the Aswan Dam. This factor surely encouraged the Eisenhower 
adm inistration to continue in the direction of revoking its offer of aid.
Slightly over a m onth after Nasser recognized China, Eugene 
Black, president of the IBRD, returned from negotiations with Nasser 
concerning financing the dam. Eisenhower rem arked th a t when Dulles 
informed him  of the counterproposals Nasser had  p u t forth in response 
to W estern offers, they concluded th a t Nasser had no intention of 
working with the West. The President wrote in Waging Peace: "When 
Foster described the extraordinary counterproposals th a t Nasser had 
given to Eugene Black, the two of us concluded th a t N asser was not 
really interested in serious negotiation of the project." He continued by 
stating  th a t they "considered the m atter dead for all practical 
purposes."23 Eisenhower and Dulles interpreted N asser’s plans as 
simply an  effort to blackmail the United S tates into an arrangem ent 
which would benefit Egypt more. Perhaps one th a t would allow N asser
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to m aintain greater control over Egypt’s financial affairs and allow for a 
less dem anding repaym ent schedule.
They interpreted N asser’s in terest in the Soviet proposals as 
blackmail also. Not only did the fact th a t the Egyptian President had 
explored Soviet proposals for building the dam  weaken Congressional 
in terest in the project because Americans would not to associate with 
the Com m unists, b u t it also m ust have made the Secretary of S tate and 
the President view the less powerful Egypt - compared with America - as 
som ewhat insolent.24 N asser’s flirtations with both America and R ussia 
created an uncertainty  about his intentions th a t increased the suspicion 
in the Eisenhower adm inistration to the point where officials completely 
distrusted  Nasser.
The debate about w hether Nasser planned to work with America or 
Russia was held behind the doors of the D epartm ent of State. On Ju n e  
25, 1956, it rem ained unclear w hat N asser would do. Eugene Black 
commented th a t he believed "if the west did not proceed with the project, 
the Soviets would make a deal...." He was not positive th a t the 
Com m unists could succeed in the enterprise, b u t a t m inim um  they 
would m ake an effort. Black continued with a warning th a t the Egyptian 
president was now politically tied to the project. He added th a t Nasser 
was receiving more inviting offers of assistance from the Soviets, yet he 
still believed th a t N asser preferred to do business with America.25
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Three days later, it was apparent th a t few high government 
officials, particularly the Secretary of State, adhered to Black’s argum ent 
for financing the dam. At a National Security Council m eeting/Secretaiy 
Dulles commented th a t constructing the dam  would lead to 
difficulties for the United S tates in the host country. Whichever nation 
constructed the Aswan Dam undoubtedly would be held in contem pt by 
the paren t country because of the inevitable hardships the dam ’s cost 
would place on the Egyptian people themselves. The agreem ent reached 
in regard to paying for the dam  left the Egyptians responsible for
900,000,000 dollars of the slightly over one billion dollar price tag.26 
This gigantic am ount was guaranteed to stretch the Egyptian economy to 
the limit. Also, it was believed Egypt would request further financial aid 
once the project had begun.27
Dulles’ reasoning was logical. It also conveniently solved the 
problem of w hether or not to finance the dam. Clearly, if it would not be 
beneficial to the United S tates - the Egyptian m asses would come to hate 
w hat N asser referred to as imperialist America - there was no reason to 
pu rsue the dam. America’s aim a t offering financial aid was to move 
closer to the Egyptians, not alienate itself from them.
A contem poraiy com m entator pu t forth the idea th a t "stories 
suggest th a t W ashington, having discovered Moscow would not help 
Egypt with the dam, had decided it was safe to risk N asser’s
of S tate
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displeasure..." and to cancel the offer to finance the dam .28 Although this 
theory was possibly correct, it cannot be substan tia ted . Charles Bohlen, 
American Am bassador in the USSR, did not report to W ashington th a t 
the Soviets were unwilling to undertake the project until Ju ly  22, after 
Dulles had withdrawn the American offer.29
Aid from the United S tates for the High Aswan Dam was 
w ithdrawn on Ju ly  19. At least two days before that, Dulles and the 
S tate departm ent had decided tha t the project no longer showed enough 
prom ise to w arran t the involvement of the United States. N asser had 
been playing Soviet against American, a  game which the Eisenhower 
-adm inistration did not approve of; the Egyptian president had  to ally 
with one nation or the other, dealing with .bjq th Jh eJJS an d  the USSR _
I broke Cold War rules, a t least as far as the American policv m akers wereL ------------------------------
concerned.
On the seventeenth of Ju ly  the A ssistant Secretary of S tate for 
Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs wrote a m em orandum  to 
Dulles outlining Aswan Dam policy. The A ssistant Secretary, George 
Allen, commented th a t "Nasser is pursuing policies in the Near E ast 
opposed to reasonable U.S. objectives and supporting Soviet objectives. 
N asser is not guided appreciably by ’cold war’ considerations b u t by his 
own vision of ’Egypt’s destiny.’"30 Undoubtedly galled by the fact th a t 
N asser would not toe the line, Allen’s memo continued by recom mending
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th a t the United States, "clearly withdraw the December offer on the 
Aswan Dam." It speculated th ^ t the Egyptian reaction to this action 
would be to accept the Russian offer and the Soviets would require 
Egyptian economic subservience as a price for building the dam .31 That 
resu lt was preferable to concurrently supporting Egypt with the 
Com m unists.
In essence, the United States saw itself as abandoning N asser to 
Com m unist claws. The memo stated th a t withdrawal of the Aswan Dam 
offer would be looked upon favorably by some of the other Middle 
Eastern  countries. It referred to Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, Turkey, Iran, 
and Iraq as all standing to gain something from cancellation of the 
project. This would help the US position in th a t area of the world.32
Of course, diplomatically, the United S tates wished to appear 
concerned with hum anitarianism  and therefore would not cancel all 
assistance. Dulles would offer the Egyptian Ambassador, Ahmad 
Hussein, economic aid for other projects. And, dam  aid m ight come a t a 
later date, when N asser became more congenial toward the United 
S tates.33 Although the proposition was made, the S tate D epartm ent did 
not believe N asser would agree to it. It was unacceptable for Egypt, 
since N asser was committed to the Aswan Dam.
On Ju ly  19 the final decision was made. Dulles approached his 
President for approval in the morning. Dulles listed the reasons for
LEADING UP TO THE C R IS IS  -  26  -
withdrawal one by one and gained Eisenhower’s sanction to cancel the 
project. It was recorded th a t "The President concurred with the 
Secretary’s view th a t we should withdraw the US offer upon the occasion 
of the A m bassador’s visit."34
Am bassador H ussein arrived th a t afternoon and was informed th a t 
the offer of financial aid for the High Aswan Dam had been withdrawn. 
The difficulty th a t arose, the crucial factor th a t Dulles had not fully 
analyzed, was th a t H ussein "was returning to W ashington with the 
publicly announced intention of accepting the US-UK-IBRD offer of 
financing."35 By expressly rejecting Nasser’s acceptance of the proposal’, 
Dulles committed a diplomatic faux pas. He gave N asser no viable 
m eans of saving face. N asser was left holding his hands out, only to 
have them  slapped down, an  em barrassing position for the Arab.
The Am bassador insisted th a t Nasser preferred to accept the 
American proposal over the Soviet one. But, he warned, N asser was 
determ ined to construct the Aswan Dam and therefore would accept the 
Soviet offer if the West withdrew its financial aid. He also stated th a t 
N asser was now willing to accept the original term s for aid offered in 
December 1955,36 His pleas were of no avail. Following their meeting, 
the S tate D epartm ent announced, "the U.S. Government has concluded 
th a t it is not feasible in present circum stances to participate in the 
[Aswan] project."37 That single sentence made withdrawal of Aswan
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funding official.
Following the announcem ent of withdrawal Eisenhower wondered 
w hether it had  been too abrupt. He commented in Waging Peace, "I was 
concerned...that we might have been undiplom atic in the way the 
cancellation was handled." Although m any would agree with this 
assessm ent, Dulles denied it. In a letter to Eisenhower, he rem arked 
th a t the Egyptians should have anticipated America’s actions. The 
United S tates had pointedly neglected to respond to an Egyptian 
m em orandum  dealing with the dam. Additionally, several h in ts had  
been dropped th a t the United States offer was no longer valid and it was 
clear th a t Congressional support had entirely disappeared. Thus, as far 
as the Egyptians were concerned cancellation could not have been 
considered unexpected or ab rup t.38 Rather, it was impending.
Dulles correctly assum ed th a t the Egyptians were not surprised by 
America’s withdrawal of the offer. W hat he did not anticipate was 
N asser’s ability to capitalize on th a t action. Dulles’ withdrawal, although 
it m ight not have been abrup t for the Egyptian government, could easily 
be portrayed as such  to Egypt’s citizens and neighbors. In overlooking 
the option opened to Nasser by cancelling the project when Egypt was 
ready to accept it, Dulles severely miscalculated. In diplomacy 
perception is nearly all th a t m atters.
In addition, Harvard Professor Em eritus and A ssistant Secretary of
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State for Policy Planning in 1956, Robert Bowie m aintained that, "Nasser 
had  intentionally posed the issue [of accepting aid for the dam] in a form 
virtually excluding an am biguous reply."39 N asser did not provide Dulles 
the option of m aking the withdrawal appear less abrupt, had Dulles felt 
it appropriate. /This may point to the idea th a t Nasser intended to have
' " -HHMMM ......................... — — I'll- 1- - ——■— *
Dulles w ithdraw the dam  aid in such a  way as to insure th a t he could 
capitalize on the Egyptian an tirAmerican response. |  Em phasizing Dulles’ 
perceived sudden withdrawal, Nasser now had an outrage to which he 
could react.
On Ju ly  25 President Nasser announced he would respond 
decisively to the withdrawal of the Aswan Dam proposal the following 
day in Alexandria.40 At 11 p.m., on the twenty-sixth, 
a  som ewhat frantic telegram arrived a t the D epartm ent of State. Sent 
from the em bassy in Cairo, its text informed the American government 
th a t N asser had nationalized the Suez Canal. In his speech N asser 
outlined his plan to use the profits from the canal to fund construction 
of the Aswan Dam. The American Am bassador commented th a t "Nasser 
was clearly emotional and excited" about his action.41 Perhaps, this was 
due to the fact th a t N asser potentially had beaten both super powers at 
their own game. He had expelled both "Communist" and "Democratic" 
ideologies. Neither country now had the opportunity to require 
subjugation of Egyptian goals to the desires of its nation in re tu rn  for
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financial aid to construct the Aswan Dam.
Historian Herbert Parm et stated in Eisenhower and the American 
C rusades, th a t the canal’s seizure had completely surprised the 
Eisenhower adm inistration. He contended th a t no advisor had  foreseen 
N asser’s move.42 If they had, why would Dulles have provided the 
Egyptian President with an  excuse to nationalize the canal? The aid 
w ithdrawal could have been executed more delicately had Dulles 
expected Nasser to use it as an  excuse to grab the Suez. Also, as Parm et 
pointed out, there is no apparent evidence th a t contradicts his theory.
Author Terence Robertson, however, claimed in Crisis, The Inside 
Story of the Suez Conspiracy, th a t Dulles and British Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden had discussed the topic. Robertson reported Dulles 
believed th a t if N asser seized the Suez, he "would not be unduly 
concerned. No m atter w hat difficulties arose, he was confident th a t 
American know how and ingenuity would over come them."43 If Dulles 
and Eden considered the possibility of Nasser nationalizing the canal, it 
seem s improbable th a t a record of the conversation would not be 
recorded. Dulles seemed to report nearly all of his discussion in 
m em orandum s, yet this one is has not been found.
Robertson m aintained his report was accurate, bu t failed to 
support his statem ent in any way. He held th a t because of 
confidentiality, his sources had to rem ain unidentified. W ithout
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footnotes there is no way to substan tia te  his theoiy. Conversely, 
Parm et’s belief th a t the S tate D epartm ent and Eisenhower were caught 
off guard better fits the American reaction and the docum ents available. 
It therefore is more probable th a t the United S tates was surprised.
On August 12 N asser commented, in a  press conference, th a t he 
had  been considering nationalization of the Suez Canal for the previous 
two years.44 The Aswan aid withdrawal convinced him  to take the step.
It is more probable th a t he intentionally capitalized on Dulles’ abrupt 
diplomatic decision to withdraw funding and adroitly used  it as an 
excuse to seize the canal.
In addition, it was not until shortly before the w ithdrawal of aid 
th a t N asser could have realized his goal of nationalizing the Suez. In 
1954 Great Britain had am assed 80,000 troops in the canal zone, m uch 
to the dism ay of Egyptian nationalists. The Egyptian government 
responded with a  request th a t Britain remove all of its troops from 
Egyptian territory. In an effort, once again, to improve relations between 
the United S tates and Egypt, Secretaiy of S tate Dulles arranged for an  
agreem ent whereby all British soldiers would evacuate their Suez bases. 
A two year time table was established for the troop withdrawal. It was 
clearly not a  coincidence th a t N asser nationalized the canal one m onth 
after the final British troops had left the Suez Canal.45 Removal of 
Britain’s soldiers gave the Egyptian President a free hand  to take control
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of the zone.
Dulles was then, and has been since, criticized for instigating the 
w ithdrawal of British troops. In the m idst of the Suez Canal Crisis US 
News and World Report printed an article implicating Dulles in the troop 
removal.46 Herbert Parm et rem arked th a t "Dulles...had pressured  the 
British to evacuate their eighty thousand  troops from the Suez Canal."47 
The statem ents were accurate, b u t the criticism ignored American policy 
in 1954. Any pressure Secretary of S tate Dulles exerted for troop 
removal had  been a part of Eisenhower’s schem e to develop alliances.
The President noted in a letter to Winston Churchill w ritten on 
Ju ly  22, 1954 th a t the West had to cater to sm aller nations. He wrote 
"We know th a t there is abroad in the world a fierce and growing spirit of 
nationalism . Should we try to dam  it up  completely, it would, like a 
mighty river, b u rst through the barriers and could create havoc." He 
told Churchill th a t America and Great Britain had to follow "a program  
jointly to undertake to help these nations achieve...progress. [They 
m ust] seek to pu t this whole m atter in such  a light as to gain us friends 
- to be positive ra ther than  negative."48 In 1954 Egypt appeared to be 
the kind of nationalistically inclined nation Eisenhower believed the US 
and UK had to help. Troop withdrawal represented a m eans "to be 
positive ra ther than  negative." By 1956, when it became increasingly 
clear N asser would not conform to W estern desires, the idea of British
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troop withdrawal appeared less inviting. W hat has rem ained unknow n 
until recently is th a t the S tate D epartm ent actually advised Great Britain 
to disregard its removal agreem ent if a  plausible excuse could be 
devised. The pressure to withdraw troops th a t Parm et m entioned may 
have been applied in 1954, b u t by 1956 it was reversed.
In M arch 1956 the S tate D epartm ent’s Director of Near Eastern, 
South  Asian, African Affairs F raser Wilkins, wrote a m em orandum  
concerning Egypt’s confrontational stance. Among the various 
recom m endations for action in response to N asser’s policies was th a t 
"The United S tates would suggest to the British th a t they immediately 
slow down the withdrawal of British troops from Suez."49 By this time, 
over seventy-five percent of the British soldiers already had left Egypt.
On March 28, the final draft of Wilkins’ policy sta tem ent was issued. It 
repeated the suggestion of two weeks before, verbatim, with the added 
qualifier: "It is realized th a t this suggestion might be impracticable."50 
Wilkins’ proposal was not his opinion alone. Dulles also supported the 
idea. His lack of reaction to the Wilkins report can be interpreted as his 
acceptance of its relevance, for he did see the memo.51 Had he disagreed 
with Wilkins’ position, Dulles doubtless would have repudiated the 
m em orandum ’s content.
Thus, upper level S tate D epartm ent officials now were nervous 
about leaving the Suez Canal unprotected from the country through
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which it ran . They developed the belated hope th a t the British troop 
evacuation treaty  Dulles had arranged could be overlooked. In 1954 
Eisenhower - and probably Dulles - m ust have been confident th a t 
British troop removal would earn N asser’s undying allegiance. The 
President and Secretary of S tate expected Nasser to respond to this 
gesture by moving into the W estern camp. B ut Nasser failed to react as 
the Americans had anticipated. He accepted the gift w ithout providing 
friendship in return . In retrospect American leaders appear blind to this 
unfavorable outcome, bu t at the time government officials probably did 
not view N asser as a major th rea t to US dominance. American 
overconfidence might well have been the factor which caused Eisenhower 
officials to ignore the tactical error they had made by coaxing the British 
to abandon their Suez fortifications.
By March, 1956 the Administration realized troop withdrawal had 
not borne the fruits originally expected. The West’s show of good faith 
was not reciprocated. Wilkins’ planning statem ent hinted th a t American 
foreign policy m akers had gained an inkling of the opportunity they had 
given N asser and now were attem pting to block th a t hole. Despite the 
desire to stop British troops withdrawal, however, the efforts proved 
unsuccessful.
Since all British troops evacuated their positions on time, one can 
assum e the plan ran  into difficulty somewhere along the line. The
LEADING UP TO THE C R IS IS  • -  34  -
British, w hether unable to invent a  reasonable excuse to halt troop 
extraction, or simply unwilling to delay troop evacuation, pulled out their 
final soldiers on Ju n e  18. The former possibility appears more probable 
th an  the latter, b u t there also exists a  third explanation. That is th a t 
British officials never were informed of the S tate D epartm ent’s 
suggestion. In any case, Nasser, expecting Dulles’ withdrawal of aid, 
used the perceived insu lt to his u tm ost advantage and seized the canal 
w ithout opposition. President Eisenhower, who had rem ained primarily 
an  overseer, began to take a more active role as the potential for an  
allied response increased. The Suez Crisis had begun.
In the middle of March, 1956, when the Eisenhower 
adm inistration was reevaluating its offer of economic aid for the Aswan 
Dam, the S tate D epartm ent m em orandum  drafted by Wilkins expressed 
w hat America sought in the countries it supported. The United S tates 
searched for "Stable, viable, friendly governments..., capable of 
w ithstanding com m unist-inspired subversion from within, and willing to 
resist com m unist aggression."52 Dulles and the D epartm ent of S tate had 
attem pted to tu rn  Egypt into this type of country through an act of good 
faith - they had  arranged for the removal of 80,000 foreign soldiers. 
Nasser would not allow it. He m aintained his independence of action.
In doing so he raised American suspicions to the point where the S tate 
D epartm ent considered Egypt a blackmailing, Com m unist influenced
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country. The overarching belief th a t "if you are not for us, you are 
against us" was an im portant factor. This led to two conclusions.
On one level America’s analysts believed th a t Egypt’s only goal was 
to milk the United S tates and the Soviet Union for whatever profit it 
could gain. At the sam e time,however, they concluded th a t w ithout 
American protection Egypt was destined to fall under the control of the 
Soviet Union - regardless of N asser’s desire to rid Egypt of all foreign 
Influences. N asser’s goal of complete independence was ignored because 
American officials did not believe it was attainable. The Com m unists 
would gain power, eventually, if Egypt rejected US influence.
American career diplomat, Alfred Athertan, was Second 
A m bassador in Syria during the Suez Crisis. He rem arked in his 1990 
article "The United S tates and the Suez Crisis: The Uses and Limits of 
Diplomacy" th a t the United S tates became involved in the Middle E ast 
"With its eyes fixed on the Cold War...." A thertan continued by stating 
th a t "the American Administration failed to appreciate the strength  and 
irreconcilability of the forces gathering strength in the Middle East."53 
He referred, here, to all of America’s involvement in Middle E astern  
affairs. Yet, A thertan’s statem ent directly applied to the difficulties of an 
Egypt headed by Nasser, the surrounding Arabian countries, and their 
bitter conflict with Israel.
That A thertan referred to the Eisenhower adm inistration, and
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implicitly Dulles in particular, as viewing the Middle E ast in regard to 
the Cold War, says th a t the Middle E ast was seen in term s of the Soviet 
Union’s possible expansion into th a t area. Instead of seeing the internal 
conflicts, Dulles interpreted only bi-polar considerations: America’s 
in terests and the Soviet Union’s quest for world domination, not N asser’s 
desire for an  Arab consortium. Had Dulles appreciated N asser’s 
perspective the Secretary might have planned the withdraw of funding 
more carefully.
By looking from this perspective alone, Dulles could never have 
realized N asser’s goals or the reasons behind his actions. Dulles did not 
conceive of the fact th a t Egypt might wish to rem ain truly independent, 
neither influenced nor indoctrinated by the United S tates or Russia. 
Nasser, on the other hand, was determined to form a third ideology. 
N asser’s ideology called for a confederation of the Arabian sta tes, in 
which N asser could coordinate all Arab actions against Israel and in any 
other contexts th a t were appropriate.
It was not until after the crisis began th a t Dulles adm itted N asser 
had acted as an  independent player. At the end of August Dulles stated  
th a t N asser’s nationalization of the Suez had been only a m atter of time. 
Nasser would have seized the canal at some point to "forward his policy
o f ’grandeur’" w hether the Aswmi^Dam-aiGkwas-withdrawn5,Qrnot. 
Dulles’ sentim ent implied th a t Nasser held his own goals for power,
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aside from Cold War politics. The flaw in this sta tem ent was th a t if the 
United S tates had gone through with the Aswan aid - on its original 
term s, which on Ju ly  19 Ambassador H ussein sta ted  N asser would 
accept - America’s presence in the area might have convinced Nasser not 
to nationalize the canal until the dam  was completed in an  estim ated ten 
years, 1966. Since the canal’s ownership was due to revert to Egypt in 
1968 anyway, N asser would have been wise to wait the two years 
rem aining after the scheduled completion date of the dam  and obtain the 
Suez w ithout a fight. Seizing the Suez before the Aswan Dam was 
finished would have resulted in withdrawal of American aid in the m idst 
of construction.
Prior to actual m ilitaiy action, the diplomacy surrounding Aswan 
aid and Egypt in general had received little attention from the media. 
Neither Dulles nor Eisenhower addressed' the topic of the Aswan Dam or 
the m ounting doubts about the reliability of Egypt as a conveyer of 
American interests, during the m onths before the offer’s actual 
withdrawal. In fact, even N asser’s nationalization of the Suez, could not 
compete with the more interesting dram as of closer to home news.
Although an article discussing the seizure of the Suez appeared on 
the front page of the Ju ly  27 edition of the New York Times, it was 
overshadowed by the coverage of a d isaster a t sea. Nearly three quarters 
of the front page was taken up  with a headline reporting the collision of
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two ships off the coast of N antucket - three rows of one inch letters 
across the length of the page, three accompanying photos, and several 
related articles. N asser’s move was noted halfway down the page in 
about half a  column, continued on page three.56 The public did not yet 
conceive of the great dangers inherent in N asser’s nationalization of the 
Suez Canal. The real media blitz did not begin until unhappy, angiy 
allies voiced their disapproval of N asser’s action and then  physically 
attacked Egypt.
As a military response by America’s allies increased in probability, 
President Eisenhower took control of foreign policy. Throughout his 
presidency, Eisenhower’s direction became more definite each time a 
military situation arose. Some believed th a t this crisis especially 
dem anded his attention. As his campaign for reelection approached, an 
international crisis was brewing. How he reacted could decide w hether 
or not Americans voted for him. Eisenhower’s reaction, vehem ent and 
emotional, halted the violence th a t followed N asser’s nationalization.
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CHAPTER THREE
T h e  C r i s i s  A n d  I t s  P l a y e r s
From M arch 1956 forward, the Eisenhower adm inistration was 
progressively disinclined to deal with the Egyptian President, Gamal 
Abd’ul Nasser. Dulles and Eisenhower’s dissatisfaction with Egypt’s 
political behavior and diplomatic attitude culm inated on Ju ly  19, 1956 
when Dulles withdrew the American offer of financial aid for the building 
of the High Aswan Dam. Great Britain and the IBRD followed suit.
In retaliation, on 26 July, the Egyptian leader announced the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal. N asser m aintained th a t by using tolls 
collected from the users of the appropriated canal, Egypt would be able 
to build the dam. Some of the users although little concerned with 
N asser’s rationale for nationalization, were disturbed greatly by the act 
itself. G reat Britain, France and Israel, though for different reasons, 
clearly fell into th a t category.
With a simple decree Egypt had claimed control over the canal. 
Law num ber 285 of 1956 - included in the Egyptian White Paper On the 
Nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal Com pany, which served as a
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defense for the Egyptian seizure - stated th a t "The Suez Canal Maritime
\
Company, S.A.E., is nationalized. All money, rights and obligations of 
the com pany are transferred to the State. All organizations and 
committees are dissolved."1 Until Nasser’s declaration the canal had 
been m anaged by the Suez Canal Company, an institu tion primarily 
controlled by the British and the French. In dissolving th is company, 
Law 285 promised com pensation for stock held by com pany investors. 
But, there was no doubt th a t the canal was now a sta te  institution.
Great Britain and France could not condone nationalization. They 
m aintained N asser’s action was in direct violation of the Convention of 
October 29, 1888, guaranteeing that, "The Suez Maritime Canal shall 
always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every 
vessels of commerce or war, w ithout distinction of flag."2 According to 
Britain and France, N asser’s nationalization had abridged th is right.
The British perspective on the situation was frankly stated  in a 
speech by Prime Minister Anthony Eden. On Septem ber 22, 1956 he 
m aintained the international character of the Suez Canal was 
indisputable. Eden concluded th a t "the operation of the canal by the 
Suez Canal Company was part of a comprehensive system, designed by 
the agreem ent of 1888 to assure  free use of the canal for all the powers 
concerned, and by purporting to nationalize the com pany Colonel Nasser 
had disturbed the balance of this system and removed one of its
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essential guarantees."3 England wanted to restore the original system.
From the British viewpoint, N asser’s seizure of the Canal could not 
go unansw ered. On 30 July, in the House of Commons, Eden plainly 
stated  the United Kingdom’s position. The Prime M inister told m embers 
of the House, "No arrangem ent for the future of this great waterway 
could be acceptable to Her Majesty’s Government which would leave it in 
the unfettered control of a  single power which could, as recent events 
have shown, exploit it purely for purposes of national policy."4 British 
in terests m ust be protected said Eden. "Failure to keep the canal 
in ternational would inevitably lead to the loss one by one of all our 
in terests and assets in the Middle East, and even if Her Majesty’s 
Government had to act alone they could not stop short of using force to 
protect their position."5 From the earliest stages, Great Britain had 
bound itself to re-internationalizing the canal. Eden succinctly had 
expressed the rationale for the British government’s reaction to N asser’s 
nationalization scheme, losing the canal could be losing control of the 
entire region.
Eden’s statem ent th a t Great Britain would "lose one by one all of 
our interests" was telling for its economic aspect and for its 
undercu rren t theme. Robert Rhodes Jam es, A ssistant Clerk at the 
House of Commons during the Suez Crisis and em inent biographer of 
Eden, noted th a t for the British this waterway was of the u tm ost
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im portance because two-thirds of W estern Europe’s oil sailed through
the Suez.6 Since British officials did not believe th a t N asser would run
the canal effectively and w ithout discrim ination against other nations,
the Suez had  to be reclaimed from N asser’s grip to ensure the flow of
oil.7
More importantly, perhaps, the British viewed N asser as a  nem esis 
sim ilar to the likes of Hitler. Diplomats when faced with a crisis often 
look to an historical precedent for a solution. Eden did the sam e and 
found his precedent in the late 1930s. Before World War Two, Europe 
had  appeased Hitler by allowing his territorial aggrandizem ent to go 
unchecked. Nasser, a nationalist leader with territorial am bitions, was 
claiming more land. Eden stated in his Memoir Full Circle, "The canal 
was not a problem th a t could be isolated from the m any other 
m anifestations of Arab nationalism  and Egyptian ambitions."8 This was 
Hitlerism and the appeasem ent at M unich again, b u t now Britain would 
not allow it. Eden declared "Some say th a t N asser is no Hitler or 
Mussolini. Allowing for a difference in scale, I am not so sure. He has 
followed Hitler’s pattern...."9 England, a t least would not allow Nasser as 
m uch leeway as Hitler gained. Egypt’s seizure of the Suez Canal would 
not be another Munich.
The French held a similar view of N asser and his nationalization of 
the Suez Canal. Time magazine reported in August 1956 th a t France
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was even more displeased with Nasser’s action than  England. "The
French were, if anything, angrier th an  the British. The Suez, after all,
was French-built, and its expropriated company was one of France’s
b luest chips."10 French businessm en were unlikely to appreciate the loss
of profits, N asser had  caused them  to suffer. Even if com pensated for
the worth of their stock, Frenchm en had lost untold future earnings.
Herve Alphand, first the Perm anent Representative to the United 
Nations from France and later the Am bassador to the United States, 
stated  the French government’s position in term s similar to those of 
Eden. Alphand placed Nasser in the context of Hitler. He rem arked 
"Suddenly we were faced with a unilateral act and the tearing up  of a 
contract w ithout any justification. The French people remembered other 
unilateral acts of the sam e nature which between the two world wars, 
were left unansw ered by the democracies and which gradually becoming 
more and more intolerable led us to the second world war." As clearly as 
Eden, Alphand saw similarities between N asser and Hitler. Hitler 
caused World War Two. Could N asser instigate a third world war?
From the French perspective, this might have been a possibility. 
They viewed N asser’s power base as more threatening than  Hitler’s had 
been. Alphand m aintained th a t "Nasser is an  agent of a big power m uch 
stronger than  Hitlerian Germany, even more dangerous for the w estern 
world - the Soviet Union."11 If World War Three was to be fought, it
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would be between the West and the Soviet Union. N asser’s alleged
connection to the R ussians created even more desire to end his control
of the Suez.
Alphand’s belief th a t N asser was supported by the USSR was 
related, no doubt, to the situation in Algeria. At the time France was 
battling against the Algerians, trying to suppress their fight for national 
liberation. They believed N asser supplied Algerian rebels with arm s he 
had  obtained from the Soviet Union. Time commented France was "deep 
in a  costly and frustrating struggle in Algeria, chief aider and abetter of 
the rebels is Dictator Nasser."12 As far as the French were concerned, 
Nasser was blocking their efforts to restore control in Algeria and 
Moscow was providing the Egyptian leader with the m eans to do so. 
Likewise, the French believed the USSR was involved in Nasser’s seizure 
of the Suez. If N asser’s nationalization could be reversed it would 
represent one less m anifestation of Russian covert aggression. It would 
also be a m eans of regaining control over the canal zone from a 
dictatorial ruler.
Donald Neff, a  magazine and new spaper reporter and au thor of 
Warriors a t Suez, explained th a t in reality Algeria received only a small 
num ber of arm s from Nasser. But, to m aintain a solid Arab front, 
Algerians did not contradict the illusion of Nasser providing volumes of 
weapons for their cause. Neff noted th a t the idea of N asser as "master
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plotter" and supplier of arm s for the Algerian revolt was far more
appealing to the French than  adm itting th a t the rebellion was instigated
and supported by Algerians. In fact, Neff m aintained, the m istaken
belief of Nasser’s complicity in Algeria was a m ajor factor in deciding to
attack  Egypt.13
From the British and French perspectives, N asser was another 
Hitler attem pting to seize territory illegally. The French had  the added 
com plaint th a t Nasser was helping Algeria. For both countries the Suez 
Crisis was serious enough to advocate a military solution if N asser did 
not rescind his nationalization order. From the first news of N asser’s 
seizure, French and British officials began their preparations for such  an 
attack.
Israel’s concern about Nasser arose not from his seizure of the 
canal, b u t from his hostility toward the existence of the S tate of Israel. 
Egypt, along with other Arab countries, deeply resented the creation of 
Israel in 1948 and sought its destruction. In 1956, N asser was sending 
terrorist groups, Fidaiyyun, into Israel th a t made m urderous attacks on 
the Israeli citizens. Israel’s complaint against the Egyptian President 
also stem m ed from the fact th a t their ships had been denied passage 
through the S traights of Tiran, the entrance from the Red Sea to one of 
Israel’s m ain ports, E lat.14
N asser’s action also created potentially calam itous ramifications
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for the Jew ish State. On August 10 Israeli Prime M inister David Ben-
Gurion recorded the Israeli Government’s perspective of the Suez Crisis.
He believed G reat Britain was not prepared to use force against Nasser.
Because of this, Ben-Gurion feared N asser’s impending success would
increase his desire to destroy Israel.15 The very act of nationalizing the
canal, if unansw ered, could spell the doom of Israel.
Ben-Gurion did not yet realize Anglo-French intentions to use 
force, b u t within several weeks he would be well aware of them. Before 
long, the British and French had hatched a  plan designed to regain the 
canal and oust Nasser. It was a proposal in which Israeli participation 
was requisite.
Obviously, N asser did not view the Suez situation in the sam e light 
as Israel or Great Britain and France. The Egyptian government used 
the Convention of 1888 to contend th a t Egyptian control of the Canal in 
no way contradicted the agreement. A government report cited various 
articles from the 1888 Conventions th a t noted Egypt’s right of action 
concerning the canal. The Egyptian White Paper On the Nationalization 
of the Suez Maritime Canal Company noted th a t Article Ten of the 
Convention of 1888 stated  th a t it would not interfere with actions Egypt 
"might find necessary to take for the defence of Egypt and the 
m aintenance of public order." In addition, Article Thirteen protected the 
sovereign rights of Egypt.16 Since the Convention said nothing
THE CRISIS AND ITS PLAYERS - 51 - 
specifically against nationalization of the canal, and did protect Egyptian
sovereignty, N asser reasoned his actions did nothing in opposition to the
Convention.
Although in certain ways N asser attem pted to disarm  Anglo- 
French objections and reduce conflict with Israel, he was not successful 
in placating officials in any of these countries. The memoirs of one of 
N asser’s top military officials, Abd al-Latif al-Bughdadi, revealed the 
Egyptian government’s attem pt to avoid provoking its enemies.
Bughdadi sta ted  th a t to ease Arab-Israeli tensions, N asser had  removed 
troops from the Gaza strip and stopped "sabotage" in Israel. According 
to the Egyptian general, "We wished to evade clashes and wanted to let 
these ships through the Canal so th a t preventing them  would not serve 
as a  pretext against us or justification in world opinion to attack  us."17 
In spite of these efforts and perhaps to m aintain his popularity with 
Egyptians and Arabs, Nasser’s public statem ents confirmed for the 
British and French the allegations they had leveled against him.
N asser’s comments also reflected his own reasoning for taking the
canal. His first professed reason for claiming control over the Suez
)
Canal was to gain the profits from tolls paid by ships sailing through the 
canal. As N asser stated in his speech announcing the nationalization, 
th is action would provide funds for building the Aswan Dam project. In 
withdrawing their financial support the W estern nations had  taken away
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a  project th a t was touted as a step toward an  improved standard  of
living in Egypt. Nasser told the Egyptian people th a t the W estern Powers
"are determ ined to frustrate Egyptian attem pts at progress and
industrialization."18 Now, because the West refused to help Egypt
develop, Egypt was helping itself. This anti-W estern stance undoubtedly
added to N asser’s domestic popularity.
Although to some extent this factor probably was an issue for 
Nasser, it was likely th a t his seizure of the canal was designed more to 
reduce foreign influence in Egypt than  to better the lives of his people. 
Above all else, Nasser wanted to lead a confederation of Arab sta tes 
unbeholden to any outside nation. The nationalization increased his 
prestige within the Middle East, reducing outside influences and 
bringing N asser closer to his leadership goals. Coincidentally, the action 
also improved the living standards of his own people and solidified 
N asser’s support in Egypt.
In his speeches Nasser attacked the Anglo-French position and 
sim ultaneously reinforced his own. The Egyptian President announced 
Eden "also said Egypt shall not be allowed to succeed because th a t 
would spell success for Arab nationalism  and would be against their 
policy, which aims a t protection of Israel." Nasser’s statem ent struck  two 
key topics - the survival of Israel and the suppression of Arabism. To 
Britain and France, N asser’s rem arks contained the sam e national
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appeal found in Naziism. Added to th a t was an implied th rea t against
Israel.
Neither concept reassured  the Western powers. Not comfortable 
with third world independence, Britain and France interpreted N asser’s 
speech in hostile term s. The Egyptian sought an Arabian empire th a t 
supplanted all other powers in the Middle East. N asser also strove to 
annihilate Israel, the only ally in the Middle E ast opposing his goal and a 
stalw art anti-Com m unist country.
As if Nasser’s preaching did not upset the West enough, he also 
confirmed the French charge th a t Egypt was supplying Algerians with 
arm s. Nasser informed his audience "of 8,000,000 Algerians, 10,000 are 
fighting half a million French soldiers. We have arm s sufficient to equip 
those who can fight aggressors."19 This could only aggravate the French. 
N asser adm itted he was helping the Algerians to fight against France 
and th a t he would continue to do so. Besides this, the specter of 
Russian involvement was raised again. The surp lus arm s N asser’s 
sta tem ent implied indicated th a t Egypt had received large am ounts of 
arm s from the Soviet Union. In the allied camp Com m unist influence in 
Egypt became a foregone conclusion, to be feared and reversed.
The Egyptian leader’s words were designed to appeal to Arabian 
nationalism  by discrediting Western  nations. He told his countrym en, 
"He who attacks Egypt attacks the whole Arab world. They say in their
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papers the whole thing will be over in forty-eight hours. They do not
know how strong we really are."20 He portrayed a  front not ju s t of
Egyptians, b u t of all Arabs. Indeed N asser’s goal was to unify the Arab
world around himself. Nationalization of the canal was a m eans toward
this end.
In his 1990 article "Egypt, From Military Defeat to Political Victory" 
Israeli Professor Moshe Shem esh agreed th a t Nasser’s nationalization of 
Suez was intended to increase his power and prestige, reduce foreign 
influence in the Arabian area, and if possible destroy Israel. Shem esh 
stated "The nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 26 Ju ly  1956 
symbolized for the Egyptians and the Arab world the independence of 
Egyptian decision-m aking and the liberation of Egypt from foreign 
political and economic influence." Shem esh added th a t because N asser’s 
support and prestige from Egyptians and the Arab world rested on his 
seizure of the canal, he could not retreat w ithout losing credibility, even 
if faced with a  war.21
This then  was how the British, French, and Israelis interpreted 
N asser’s nationalization and in w hat light N asser him self perceived his 
actions. During the ensuing crisis the United S tates repeatedly 
attem pted to preclude the use of force by its allies. As events unfolded
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three efforts a t negotiation failed to bring about a solution satisfactory to
any of the factions, Egyptian, Anglo-French, or Israeli. Before the crisis
was over battles were fought and blood was spilled. All of these
happenings occurred between Ju ly  27 and the first week of November.
From the s ta rt Great Britain and France were determ ined to w rest
control Of the Suez Maritime Canal from N asser and re tu rn  it to the
West.
British Prime M inister Eden had been quick to respond to the 
Egyptian President’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. The day after 
N asser’s declaration, Eden cabled President Eisenhower and said it was 
imperative th a t N asser be halted. He proposed economic and political 
p ressures be applied against Nasser immediately. Eden noted "My 
colleagues and I are convinced th a t we m ust be ready, as a last resort, to 
use force to bring N asser to his senses." Finally, Eden suggested a 
tripartite conference take place, so th a t Britain, France, and the United 
States could "align our policies and concert together how we can best 
bring m axim um  pressure to bear on the Egyptian Government." In 
response to Eden’s proposal Eisenhower dispatched Under Secretary of 
S tate for Political Affairs Robert M urphy to London to discuss the 
situation with British and French officials.22
From Ju ly  29 to August 2 American officials - M urphy was 
replaced by Secretary of S tate Dulles on the first of August - m et with
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their French and British counterparts, French Foreign M inister Christian
Pineau and British Secretary of S tate for Foreign Affairs Selwyn Lloyd.23
In these meetings, dubbed the Tripartite Conferences, Lloyd p u t forth the
British position concerning Nasser. He held th a t N asser’s
nationalization had to be reversed. Also he m aintained th a t a  military
response should be prepared as a  last resort possibility, since "political
and economic pressures [are] unlikely [to] have [the] desired effect unless
N asser knows military sanctions are in [the] background."24 Pineau
entirely agreed with this position.
An attem pt a t negotiation, however, had to be m ade before military 
action could be taken. The three powers agreed to send a com m unique 
to N asser which called for the internationalization of the canal, 
preferably under United Nations aegis, with Egypt receiving fair 
economic com pensation in return . From the Tripartite Conferences also 
came an invitation to governments th a t used the canal to take p art in a 
London Conference beginning August 16, 1956.25
In the time between the Tripartite Conference and the London 
Conference Great Britain and France were not idle. The day after the 
Tripartite meetings closed David Ben-Gurion received a report th a t the 
two countries had a plan of military attack  for regaining the canal. It 
would be executed in approximately three weeks and Israel would not be 
involved because th a t would only raise Arab-Israeli tensions.26 Ben-
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Gurion accepted this assessm ent writing in an August diaiy entry, "A
solitary ’operation’ on our part may well tu rn  out to be calam itous...."
because Israel would be condemned for its aggression.27
University of Sorbonne Professor Jean-Paul Cointet pointed out 
such  an  attack  might have resulted in the dism em berm ent of Israel by 
surrounding Arab countries.28 The risk of an  Arab' counterattack 
existed, although a concerted assau lt was improbable because Arabian 
unity  rem ained questionable. Even so, a possible m ass attack  by 
surrounding  countries rem ained a fear for the Israeli government.
The Anglo-French attack did not occur as quickly as th is original 
estim ate called for, bu t its planning was pursued actively. On Monday, 
A ugust 13, three days before the London Conference was scheduled to 
begin, Ben-Gurion noted th a t French Am bassador to Israel, Pierre- 
Eugene Gilbert, "is pessim istic regarding the internationalization of the 
Canal. In his opinion, his government will be bitter following the failure 
of the [London] Conference - they will w ant to take action - will [sic] to 
tu rn  to Israel...."29 The rem ark showed the French A m bassador’s 
conclusion, before-the-fact, th a t the conference would not achieve the 
resu lts desired by France. Gilbert’s position also first expressed the 
possibility of Israel joining with England and France in an attack  against 
Egypt. It is improbable th a t Gilbert - who no doubt m ade reports to his 
superiors regularly - was the sole Frenchm an to believe the conference
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would fail, particularly given th a t events followed Gilbert’s prophesy. In
fact, it is more logical to conclude th a t Gilbert was less as prophet, th an
an astu te  diplom at who knew the m inds of his superiors.
Of the twenty-four invitations distributed for the August 16
t
London Conference, twenty-two countries accepted. Only Egypt and 
Greece declined, the la tter in reaction to previous allied intervention on 
Cyprus.30 Near the s ta rt of the London Conference Dulles talked with 
Pineau, Eden, Lloyd, and the Prime Minister of Australia, Robert 
Menzies, to "discuss general tactics." From this session came the idea - 
apparently  raised by Menzies - to propose the creation of an 
in ternational board to oversee the running  of the Suez Canal.31 By the 
end of the Conference eighteen of the countries attending had agreed to 
this idea. Prime M inister Menzies was appointed head of a five m em ber 
m ission charged to approach Nasser with the proposal.32 Although the 
committee was cordially received in Cairo, N asser would not accept the 
plan. He assured  the em issary group of Egypt’s intention to ru n  the 
canal efficiently and effectively, b u t categorically rejected international 
control of the Suez.33 v
Dulles and Eisenhower determ ined the next negotiating direction ^  
on the night of Septem ber 8. It was then  th a t the idea of a  U sers’ 
Association first was discussed by the President and the Secretary of 
State. According to existing records, Dulles telephoned Eisenhower at
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6:30 p.m. on the eighth and spoke of the idea. Dulles proposed "the use
by the u sers’ organization of their own pilots and  their collection of the
fees with allocation to Egypt on a cost basis; the putting  into effect or
announcing of alternatives to the use of the Canal so far as oil was
concerned, and the continuance of some economic m easures taken
against Egypt.1,34 In short, the organization was designed to circumvent
Egyptian control of the canal and thereby leave Nasser controlling the
Suez in nam e alone. By hiring pilots independent of the nationalized
canal to sail ships through the canal, Dulles sought to evade all
Egyptian interference. He proposed "alternatives to the use of the Canal"
for oil, which translated  into sailing around the Cape of Good Hope and
avoiding the Suez all together. Also, continued economic pressure would
assist in forcing the Egyptians to give their consent to the
internationalization of the Suez.
To further the Cooperative Association of Suez Canal Users - 
CASU, the official nam e of the Users’ Association - a  second London 
Conference was proposed by the United States. It began on Septem ber 
19 and continued through the next two days. The eighteen nations th a t 
had  agreed to Dulles’ first plan now returned to discuss the U sers’ 
Association and other options, including taking the m atter before the 
United Nations Security Council.35 Although at least five countries 
favored bringing the Suez Crisis to the United Nations, a majority held
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th a t CASU should be adopted prior to U.N. action.36
At the meeting Dulles m aintained th a t the U sers’ Association was 
required because N asser had rejected the Eighteen Powers Proposal 
"which gave Egypt the m axim um  participation which they [the Eighteen 
Powers] deemed compatible with their own rights under the 1888 
Convention." Thus, "it became both appropriate and necessary th a t the 
governments of the users should organize as among them selves for the 
m ost effective possible enjoyment of the rights of passage given by the 
1888 Convention."37 Basically, the plan required Egypt’s acquiescence to 
work with CASU to ensure the canal rem ained open and ran  smoothly. 
Egypt would be reim bursed "for any expenses reasonably incurred by it 
in connection with the performance by Egypt of the m easure to which 
Egypt is obligated, by the Convention of 1888, to assu re  the free and 
open use  of the Canal." But, Nasser would not retain  control of the 
Canal.38
In his book The Failure of the Eden Governm ent, British 
researcher Richard Lamb reported th a t Eden supported the Suez Canal 
U sers’ Association because he believed if Nasser accepted, his prestige in 
Egypt and the Arab world would be reduced severely. The French saw 
the m easure as another way of postponing a military solution. Lamb 
com mented "The French, preoccupied with the running  sore of the 
Algerian rebellion, were desperately anxious to launch an immediate
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invasion of Egypt...."39 They believed a successful attack  would stop the
flow of weapons to Algeria and avoid another Munich. Yet, the French
were willing to accept Dulles’ proposal in nam e, since it did not hinder
their covert preparations for attack.
When asked to capitulate to the U sers’ Association, N asser once 
again refused to cooperate with the West. The Egyptian President 
m aintained, "Today they are speaking of a new association whose m ain 
objective would be to rob Egypt of the canal and deprive her of rightful 
canal dues." He concluded "it is impossible to have two bodies organizing 
navigation in the canal [i.e. CASU and Nasser’s government]. It is 
equally impossible for the proposed organization to rem ain abroad and 
continue to collect dues. If this were permissible we for our part would 
form an organization for users of the port of London...."40 Here was 
strong recrim ination of the U sers’ Association. N asser’s point was clear. 
He would as soon accept foreign control of the canal zone, as London 
would in its port.
While the Egyptian leader rem ained resolute in his decision to 
keep the Suez, Great Britain and France continued their preparations for 
military action against the N asser regime.41 As the political negotiations 
repeatedly failed, Eden’s statem ent m ade during the Tripartite 
Conference concerning the necessity of military preparation rem ained 
the Anglo-French standby. Throughout Septem ber Anglo-French
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military plans proceeded. The next step toward a military solution was
to reverse their decision th a t Israel have no part in the attack.
On Septem ber 25 Israel’s Director General of the Defense Ministry 
returned  from France with news about Anglo-French displeasure with 
the U sers’ Association. Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary: "Shimon Peres 
returned from Paris saying both France and England could not agree to 
Suez Canal U sers’ Association, so would act by force - would like 
complicity of Israel, provided Israel does not attack  Jordan." The French 
wanted an attack  by the middle of October.42 Again the battle did not 
begin as soon as the French wished. There rem ained one final attem pt 
a t a  peaceful solution.
The last effort to avoid a war over the Suez Canal had as little 
success as the previous attem pts. This effort was made, surprisingly, by 
the British and French who p u t the crisis before the United Nations 
Security Council. S tephen Ambrose pointed out in his biography of 
Eisenhower, th a t the adm inistration could not know w hether this 
represented an  attem pt by the W estern Allies to obtain a peaceful 
solution or to conceal bellicose intentions.43 As it tu rned  out, the 
resolution th a t came out of the Security Council meetings primarily 
restated  and combined the proposals already offered a t the two London 
Conferences.
Between October 5 and 13 the U.N. Security Council m et alm ost
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every day to discuss an  item p u t forth by England and France. The item
dealt with the "Situation created by the unilateral action of the Egyptian
Government in bringing to an end the system  of international operation
of the Suez Canal, which was confirmed and completed by the
Convention of 1888." In response to their own item, G reat Britain and
France p u t forth a resolution declaring the right to freedom of navigation
in the canal, the protection of said right, a m andate th a t Egypt accept
the Eighteen Powers Proposal, and in the meantime, th a t Egypt work
with the U sers’ Association.44
On the second to last day of debate, Secretary-General of the U.N. 
Dam Hammaerskjold expressed six principles on which negotiation with 
N asser could be based. The tenets were basic ground rules, alm ost de 
facto from the perspective of the British and French. The first principle 
resta ted  the opening article of the 1888 Convention calling for free and 
open tran sit of the canal w ithout discrimination toward any country.
The rem ainder called for respect of Egyptian sovereignty and  dem anded 
th a t no single country politically dominate the canal. It m aintained tolls 
be se t by m utual agreement among the canal users and required funds 
be allotted for future development of the Suez. Finally, the sixth tenet 
proposed disputes be settled by arbitration.45 Although not specifically 
calling for the m easures accepted in the Eighteen Powers Plan and the 
U sers’ Association, these principles supported the content of both
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proposals.
Additionally on October 13, the final day of debate in the Security 
Council, G reat Britain and France proposed an am endm ent to the six 
principles enum erated the previous day. This am endm ent recom mended 
th a t the Eighteen Powers Proposal be the term s for negotiation and the 
Cooperative Association of Suez Canal Users be invoked specifically. 
Soviet and Yugoslavian dissent on the vote blocked the adoption of this 
proposed addition, b u t the six tenets were passed unanim ously.46
From October 15 to end of the m onth, com m unications between 
the United S tates and Great Britain and France ceased. During this 
time American radio signal interceptors recorded a huge volume of coded 
radio traffic between France and Britain. The US was unsuccessfu l in 
decoding the m essages, bu t guessed th a t som ething was in preparation 
because of the increased quantity of transm issions. By this time 
American intelligence had already discovered th a t Israel was mobilizing. 
It was believed, however, th a t Israel was preparing for an attack against 
Jordan, not Egypt.47 The assessm ent was incorrect.
Great Britain, France, and Israel had continued discussing plans 
for their military attack during the Security Council debates. Four days 
after the U.N. talks closed the three cohorts agreed upon a scheme. 
David Ben-Gurion reported th a t having rejected direct English-French 
and French-Israeli attacks, the British suggested th a t Israel s ta rt the
THE CRISIS AND ITS PLAYERS - 65 - 
attack. Then Britain and France could "protest and when we [Israel]
reach the Canal - they will come in as if to separate and then  they’ll
destroy Nasser...."48 The plot was set. All th a t rem ained now was to
initiate the attack.
On October 29, 1956 Israel launched an  attack  across the Sinai 
D esert against Egyptian forces. The Israeli Army m ade superb  progress, 
driving down from northw estern Egypt. American officials estim ated 
th a t Israel would reach the Suez Canal in three days. Israel’s success 
was partially due to the fact th a t Egyptian military strategists had 
assum ed th a t only Great Britain would attack, and th a t it would be from 
the direction of Alexandria and Rashaid, in the northw est. Even when 
N asser received a report th a t Israel, in cooperation with France, intended 
to attack, he discounted it. He believed the rum or was designed to make 
Egyptian troops concentrate in the wrong area, facing Israel.49
Secretary Dulles, guessing th a t the British and French were 
planning military action, reasoned th a t they "may in fact have concerted 
their action with the Israelis," since if the Suez was threatened by 
Egyptian-Israeli fighting, Anglo-French forces would have the excuse 
they wanted to intervene there. Dulles also reasoned th a t the W estern 
allies might believe th a t the United States would be forced to support 
Anglo-French actions because a disavowal of them  would m ean siding 
with the Soviets.50 More than  three decades later Jean-Paul Cointet
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agreed with Dulles’ assessm ent, when he commented th a t French
Government officials did not envisage America would join with the
Soviet’s in a  condem nation of the actions of Britain, France, and  Israel.51
The French and British had m iscalculated Eisenhower’s response. 
By the middle of the day following Israel’s attack, the President was 
insisting the problem be taken directly to the United Nations, a  step 
which surely did not display American support for the attack  on Egypt. 
The United S tates pu t forth a resolution in the Security Council calling 
for a  cease fire in the Middle E ast and for all U.N. m em bers to refrain 
from using force in said area. Both Great Britain and France vetoed the 
m easure.52 If there had been any doubt of Anglo-French collusion with 
the Israelis before, this veto probably p u t it to an  end.
Later th a t afternoon France and Great Britain further confirmed 
Dulles’ suspicion of the previous day. At 2:17 p.m. the two powers 
issued a jo in t ultim atum , with a twelve hour time limit. The ultim atum  
declared th a t in the interest of protecting the canal, Israel and Egypt 
should move ten miles away from it and allow French and British forces 
to occupy th a t area. If the belligerents did not comply, Anglo-French 
troops would take the canal zone by force. As would be expected, Israel 
agreed to the plan and Egypt rejected it. The allies’ hope was th a t 
reclaiming the canal would instigate the overthrow of Nasser, place 
control of the Suez in British and French hands, and leave Israel in
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power in the Sinai.53 The scheme did not tu rn  out as well as Great
Britain and France had  hoped.
Eisenhower’s Administration continued its efforts in the United 
Nations. American representative to the U.N. H eniy Cabot Lodge, Jr. 
introduced a resolution to the General Assembly which called for the 
evacuation of Israeli troops to their original border, a  cease fire between 
Egypt and Israel, all U.N. members refrain from the use of force, and an 
embargo against Israel. The resolution was acclaimed by a great 
num ber of the United Nations members, especially delegates from 
sm aller countries who were surprised th a t America was supporting 
E gypt a  third world nation, over its W estern allies.54
Officials in the Egyptian Government convened on October 30 to 
discuss the Anglo-French ultim atum . According to Abd al-Latif al- 
Bughdadi, Nasser did not take the declaration seriously. "He was of the 
opinion th a t its aim was to cause m ost of our forces not to move towards 
the battlefield in Sinai, thereby giving Israel a  chance to gain a victory as 
a resu lt of the weakness and limited forces fighting them."55 Believing 
th is to be true, N asser rejected the ultim atum . To the Egyptian 
President’s chagrin, he discovered th a t Great Britain and France indeed 
had  been serious.
Ignoring the resolutions proposed in the U.N., G reat Britain and 
France began their attack  on Egypt. On October 31, after the
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ultim atum ’s twelve hour time limit had expired, the British Royal Air
Force bombed Cairo and Port Said, one of Egypt’s m ain ports. In
retaliation President N asser scuttled ships in the Suez Canal, m aking
passage through the canal impossible.56 Soon after the bombings,
English and French paratroopers landed around the Suez and Port Said.
This was followed by an am phibious assau lt.57
Seven days after the Anglo-French attack had begun, Prime 
M inister Anthony Eden was prepared to pu t a  halt to it. On November 6, 
election day in the United States, Eden informed President Eisenhower 
th a t he was willing to accept a cease fire and U.N. peace keeping force. 
Ambrose pointed out th a t by th a t time Great Britain and France 
controlled the canal zone, bu t a t least for England, the m onetary cost 
had  been outrageous. The British already had spent 500 million dollars 
on the operation.58
More importantly, Eisenhower had not allowed any loans to be 
granted to the British Treasury, once the fighting began. When the war 
started  a run  on the Pound occurred, thus the President’s ban  on loans 
to England deflated the British Pound tremendously. Besides this, 
Eisenhower called for an oil embargo against Britain. The United 
Kingdom could ill afford continued aggression.59 France could not 
support the operation w ithout British participation, and  was also 
pressured  to desist. By the end of November a U.N. peace keeping force
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was in place and m ost of British and French troop had  been evacuated.60
The crisis was over and Nasser had  retained his canal.
G reat Britain and France, the two countries who resolutely 
m aintained the necessity of force in ousting Nasser from the Suez, and 
indeed th a t N asser’s nationalization had to be resisted a t all, found 
themselves with the shortest straw  a t the end of the Suez Canal Crisis. 
Their rationale for action and desires for results had failed to be proven 
correct, by the fact th a t none of the Anglo-French goals had been 
achieved. Gamal Nasser, on the other hand, had gained im m easurable 
prestige and power in the Arab world.
Moshe Shem esh noted th a t although Egypt had  suffered a military 
defeat, N asser emerged from the crisis with a political victory. It was a 
victory th a t was clear to the entire Arab world. A quick review of the 
score card revealed Nasser had racked up  all the points, while Great 
Britain, France, and Israel appeared to be scoreless. Both British and 
French forces were evacuated from the Suez area and Israel had 
w ithdrawn its troops from the Sinai.61 In Shem esh’s words, "for Nasser, 
the crisis was a test of the legitimacy of his leadership and his decision 
to nationalize the Canal. He emerged from the crisis as the charism atic 
leader of Egypt and the Arab world. His concept of Arab nationalism , in 
all its aspects, became the cornerstone of Arab politics."62 N asser had 
won.
THE C R IS IS  AND IT S PLAYERS -  70  -
Joseph  Frankel, a  British Professor a t the University of
Southam pton, stated  th a t for the British "the Suez action...can be largely 
explained in term s of the psychological predispositions...." He concluded 
th a t behind the rationale for military action given by Eden and Lloyd lay 
psychological pressures from within British society. Frankel explained 
th a t "the graceful withdrawal from the [British] Empire and the 
shrinking world role had built up resentm ents among the British who 
were required a spot of adventure before settling to a less spectacular 
foreign policy."63 That "spot of adventure" was found in the form of the 
Suez Canal. Like a too strong cup of tea, it left a bitter taste  in the 
m outh of England.
The actions taken by England do appear to have been less than  
reasonable and th u s the result of some emotional response to N asser’s 
seizure. Frankel pointed out th a t had violence been avoided Great 
Britain would have lost little through nationalization. The pecuniary loss 
of giving up  the canal could have been recouped by seizing Egyptian 
assets in London. It was also improbable British ships would have been 
denied passage through the canal, given th a t Middle E astern  oil 
producers were as interested in selling their product as England was in 
buying it.64 It also seemed clear Nasser’s political success would have 
been minimized had he not been given the propaganda opportunity to 
consolidate his position in the Arab world, by opposing the W estern
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world. Had British officials considered these factors fully they would
have realized a  military attack  was the least beneficial reaction a t their
disposal.
Similar to the British, Cointet m aintained th a t the French 
rationale for a  military solution was a result of behind the scenes 
motivation. The French Government, said the author, attem pted to 
show W estern Europe’s independence of action. In spite of America’s 
lack of support for the French position, which had  been hoped for,
France carried out its military plans with the help of England.65 Cointet 
saw the French Government as using the situation as a m eans of 
displaying its own ability to act w ithout the consent or assistance of the 
United States. France did succeed in acting, b u t the resu lts obtained 
were not those desired.
Frankel and Cointet’s theories are intriguing, b u t cannot be 
substan tia ted  by the information available. W hat is definite is th a t the 
military actions taken by Britain and France did not achieve the results 
the aggressors sought. N asser’s grasp on the Suez Canal was not 
lessened for a moment. And, of all the powers vying for influence or 
control in Egypt, only N asser’s bid was successful.
Laid bare to the world was the fall of the British Empire and its 
reliance on the good graces of the United S tates. Although Eisenhower’s 
p ressure on the British Pound was not common knowledge, the
THE CRISIS AND ITS PLAYERS - 72 - 
international public was aware of the US embargo on oil. In any case,
the crippling effect of crossing America’s aims was clear. Against
American sanctions, the United Kingdom could not survive.
France may have displayed its independence of action, as Cointet 
stated, b u t it gained nothing for its trouble. Its actions were regarded as 
immoral and were denounced by the United Nations. A country 
supposedly against R ussia’s strong arm  tactics was guilty itself of the 
sam e approach. Am bassador Alphand’s anger a t N asser’s suspected 
interference in Algeria was unfounded. Algerian independence was 
inevitable regardless of N asser’s assistance or lack there of, since the 
rebels did not actually rely upon Egyptian arm s or funds. France, 
em barrassed by its quick defeat a t the beginning of World War Two at 
the hands of Hitler, received another em barrassing black eye when it 
went up  against Nasser and Egypt. The former sham e was of a military 
nature , the la tter one was mostly political. Both were unpleasantly  
received and mortifying to French pride.
Unlike its partners, Israel fared better than  Britain or France in 
achieving satisfactory results. In 1990 Shimon Peres, Director General 
of the M inistry of Defense during the crisis, wrote an  article entitled "The 
Road to Serves". In the article Peres commented on the goals Israel 
hoped to obtain by going to war with Egypt. According to the author,
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Israel was not concerned with the canal per say, b u t ra ther with gaining
unhindered passage to Port Elat - through the S traights of Tiran -and
ending the terrorist attacks in Israel. Peres noted th a t both of these
goals were achieved.66 Israel’s impressive advances across the Sinai
provided Prime M inister Ben-Gurion with a bargaining chip when the
cease-fire was enacted. This enabled him to obtain N asser’s guarantee
th a t the S traights would remain open and the Fidaiyyun attacks would
end, in exchange for returning the Sinai.67
Peres’ optim ist conclusion th a t Israel obtained all it was after in 
the Suez campaign is not entirely realistic. Certainly, for example,
Israeli officials would have preferred to have G reat Britain and France in 
charge of the Suez Canal ra ther than  Egypt. Easy canal travel would be 
ensured then. Further, had Eden been successful in his efforts, N asser’s 
rule would have ended when nationalization did. Given th a t Ben-Gurion 
feared Nasser’s increased prestige would m ake him more inclined to 
launch an assau lt on Israel, it is probable N asser’s ousting was desired 
by the Israeli government, a t some level. N asser’s success had greatly 
bolstered his image among Arabs. Therefore, one concludes th a t 
although Israel came out of the foray far less scathed th an  either of its 
allies, it nonetheless had received a defeat in the face of Egypt’s victory.
W hat of the Soviet menace, the W estern world’s rival, Russia. The 
French A m bassador to the United S tates believed N asser was controlled
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by the USSR. Yet, throughout the conflict, R ussian objectives went
unfulfilled. Nasser, like Cointet theorized about the French, desired
m ost of all to m aintain his independence of action - to avoid the
influences of either super power. He achieved his goal. Com munism
was not a  motivating factor for Nasser, nationalism  served th a t purpose.
The fear of Soviet influence in Egypt was not unique to the French. 
In the  United S tates the USSR was always the prim aiy concern. From 
America’s perspective the Soviet Union was the Cold War - remove it and 
the problems ended, subdue Com m unist influence and the free world 
was safe. One can be positive then  th a t the Cold War, in some way, 
influenced Eisenhower in his reaction to the Suez Canal Crisis. Up to 
th is point, however, America’s involvement in the crisis only has been 
touched upon. The United S tates was against the Anglo-French military 
initiative and harshly  criticized the actions of France, England, and 
Israel. But, to discover w hat motivated and guided Eisenhower and his 
Secretary of S tate John  Foster Dulles one m ust examine their actions 
more closely.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
S t a n d i n g  A g a i n s t  T h e  A l l i e s
To the surprise of the world and perhaps m ost of all to the British 
and the French the Eisenhower Administration reacted caustically to 
Israel’s October 29 assau lt against Egypt and the following Anglo-French 
ultim atum . Bringing the m atter before the United Nations Security 
Council and, failing in th a t attem pt, the General Assembly, the United 
S tates succeeded in passing a resolution dem anding an immediate 
cease-fire of all forces in the Middle East. Had Eisenhower betrayed his* 
NATO allies? During the three m onths prior to the British-French-Israeli 
a ttack  the President continuously w arned th a t the United S tates 
government would not support a  military solution to the Suez Crisis.
The President was true to his word. As Nasser had lashed out when 
denied his objective, so too Eisenhower now used all his resources to 
obtain a  cease-fire, even against the wishes of Great Britain and France.
President Eisenhower’s reaction to the nationalization of the Suez 
Canal was nearly instantaneous. From Ju ly  27 and through the entire 
crisis, Eisenhower insisted th a t military force could be justified only after
STANDING AGAINST THE ALLIES - 80 - 
all other options had  been attem pted w ithout success. As negotiations
failed, the President’s desire for a peaceful solution became more
adam ant. Perhaps he was obsessed with avoiding war. Perhaps he
realized th a t each failed negotiation brought w ar closer to the Middle
East. W hatever the case, when the crisis culm inated in violence,
Eisenhower’s w rath  was unleashed. Although varying explanations for
his reaction have been offered, it appears th a t the President was
motivated primarily by a pair of factors - the Cold War and rem aining
true  to the principles he had lived by throughout his military and
political careers.
In the past, Americans have claimed th a t responsibility for the US 
stance lay with Secretary of State, John  Foster Dulles. There have also 
been charges m ade th a t Eisenhower and Dulles reacted harshly  because 
of the crisis’ close proximity to the 1956 election or th a t the pair was 
angiy because they had not been consulted or informed of the Anglo- 
French plan. When the events and facts are examined, however, one can 
see th a t none of these theories provide an accurate representation or 
explanation of the Suez Crisis.
A m isconception held before the historical reconstruction of 
Dwight D. Eisenhower in the early 1980s was th a t John  Foster Dulles 
m ade foreign policy decisions and the President simply rubber stam ped 
Dulles’ ideas. As Eisenhower’s intricacies have been revealed and
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evaluated this interpretation of events largely has been dism issed. Prior
to the reconstruction of Eisenhower’s image, m any people attributed
America’s peaceful stance during the Suez situation to the Secretary of
State. In fact, it was Eisenhower, with Dulles’ agreement, who insisted
on peaceful negotiations. And it was Eisenhower who exploded when
this course was abandoned by the allies.
The allies-turned-adversaries of the Suez Crisis have never 
contested th a t it was the President who was responsible for America’s 
reaction to hostilities and th a t his reaction was one of fury. Michael 
Guhin, au thor of John  Foster Dulles A S tatesm an and his Times, 
included convincing evidence taken from crisis participants th a t 
discounts the belief th a t Dulles was behind America’s reaction and 
affirms the idea th a t Eisenhower was incredibly angry.1 He noted th a t 
the British Secretary of S tate for Foreign Affairs Selwyn Lloyd "and Abba 
Eben, Israel’s Am bassador to Washington, viewed Dulles as a  possible 
’agent for some salvage operation,’ while Eisenhower ’was in a mood of 
someone betrayed.’" There was a great difference in the Eben-Lloyd 
descriptions of these two statesm en. Dulles was trying to rescue the 
situation, ease tensions between the allies, find a solution th a t would 
not resu lt in W estern Europe’s humiliation. Eisenhower on the other 
hand, was someone betrayed, and more inclined to seek vengeance and 
retribution th an  a resolution favorable to the aggressors.
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In addition, Guhin reminded his readers th a t Secretary Dulles
checked into a  hospital the day after he addressed the United Nations 
General Assembly.2 Dulles entered Walter Reed hospital on November 3 
with the first signs of the stom ach cancer destined to take his life in 
1959. Secretary Dulles was out of the direct decision m aking process 
before America forced acceptance of the cease-fire. He could not have 
been its source.
The above discussion is not m eant to imply th a t Eisenhower did 
not consult with Dulles or agree with m uch of the advice Dulles offered 
him. The two men were frequently of the same mind. In the goal of 
finding a peaceful solution, Dulles and the President worked as one, 
un til Dulles’ illness p u t him  out of commission. But, w hether or not 
Dulles was present, Eisenhower would have been in charge.
From the beginning, the US government was aware of the Anglo- 
French in terest in a military solution. On Ju ly  27, Prime M inister Eden 
sen t a telegram to Eisenhower in which he insisted military force rem ain 
an option.3 The same day White House officials received a  sim ilar report 
about the French stance from the American Am bassador in Paris, 
Douglas Dillon.4 Neither the President nor the Secretary of S tate 
condoned an  aggressive response.
Given their agreement, Dulles and Eisenhower worked toward the 
m utual goal of keeping the peace on both sides. A Special National
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Intelligence Estimate prepared in September concluded that the UK and
France would tiy  to keep their military options open, b u t probably would
not take th a t course unless Nasser provided a "violent provocation" - an
attack  on nationals or property. Authors of the intelligence estim ate
believed N asser was cognizant of this and reasoned he would avoid all
possible provocations.5 Hence, Dulles and Eisenhower were not
concerned with the Egyptians, bu t with their allies.
As if in mocking clairvoyance, the estim ate added th a t conceivably 
"other situations of friction in the area might develop in such  a way as to 
furnish  an occasion for the UK-French military intervention against 
Nasser."6 This guess proved correct. Yet, those writing the estim ate had  
not foreseen th a t the situation guessed at would be a construct of Anglo- 
French conspirators designed to provide the excuse for an  attack.
The concern about Britain and France was well-founded. On 
A ugust second, Dulles reported th a t Great Britain and France’s 
determ ination to use force had not abated. Dulles sta ted  th a t he was 
attem pting to convince them  to lobby in favor of international control of 
the Canal - the Users’ Association - instead of attacking Egypt to gain 
Anglo-French control.7 World opinion might support the former, bu t 
surely would reject the latter.
During an evening conversation with Dulles on Septem ber 8, 
Eisenhower expressed doubts as to w hether the Users’ Association could
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succeed. As the exchange continued, it demonstrated both Eisenhower’s
and Dulles’ interest in keeping the peace. Honestly, Dulles responded to
the Com mander in Chiefs insecurity: "I was not sure either but...I felt we
had to keep the initiative and keep probing along lines, particularly since
there was no chance of getting the British and the French not to use
force unless they had  some alternatives th a t seemed to have in them
some strength of purpose and some initiative." To this, according to
Dulles, "The President expressed again his deep concern th a t military
m easures should not be taken."8 Their objectives were clearly the same:
negotiation and peace.
One m onth later a t an NSC meeting, Eisenhower commented he 
and Dulles agreed in essence "that if the United S tates could ju s t keep 
the lid on a  little longer, some kind of compromise plan could be worked 
out for a settlem ent of the Suez problem."9 The User’s Association had 
been one m eans of keeping the lid on. By this time, however,
Eisenhower recognized th a t he could not be certain of w hether or not the 
US would have the time to work out a compromise. If an  attack 
occurred, the efforts m ade by Dulles and the plans m ade by Eisenhower 
would go to waste.
Unbeknownst to the President, his time had  already expired.
Within three days the British and French began their information 
blackout, during which they planned, with Israel, to reclaim the Suez
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Canal. Despite Eisenhower’s best efforts, England and France were bent
on force.
It is obvious th a t Eisenhower and Dulles supported a peaceful 
conclusion for the Suez conflict as the best solution. Publicly both 
Dulles and Eisenhower announced th a t America would not accept a 
military attack  unless it was the absolute last resort. On Septem ber 5, 
Eisenhower stated in a news conference th a t he sought a negotiated 
resolution - "one th a t will insure to all nations the free use of the canal 
for the shipping of the world, w hether in peace or in war, as 
contem plated by the 1888 convention."10
Two weeks later Dulles declared: "We shall be unrem itting in our 
efforts to seek by peaceful m eans a ju s t solution giving due recognition 
to the rights of all concerned, including Egypt."11 These were not isolated 
statem ents for either official. W hat is not m ade clear by them , however, 
is why this pair was against military action. W hat compelled President 
Eisenhower - hero general of World War Two - to insist th a t G reat 
Britain and France avoid hostilities and th a t Israel desist in its 
aggression? The answer is primarily twofold - w hat might be term ed 
moral and ethical indignation and Cold War considerations. The former 
motivation behind Eisenhower’s reaction has several incarnations: 
Egyptian sovereignty, standing by one’s principles, and world opinion. 
The second refers to Eisenhower’s continuing quest to stem  and reverse
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the spreading Soviet influence throughout the world. Together these
factors combined to shape America’s response to the British-French-
Israeli attack  on Egypt during the Suez Crisis.
On October 11, President Eisenhower held a news conference
during which he reviewed several guiding principles for dealing with the
Suez Canal affair. The list began with "respect... Egyptian sovereignty;"
and was followed by "insistence]...upon ...efficient operation of the
Canal;"12 In Eisenhower’s mind these two concerns ranked high.
Sovereignty was a philosophical concept, while efficiency dealt with the
practical side of the situation.
Respect for Egyptian sovereignty was im portant because of
America’s heritage. The sanctity of a  country’s territory had  been
ingrained in United States history. It had been won when the US fought
for its freedom in American Revolution. And, America still claimed to
*
defend freedom throughout the world. All independent nations had 
certain rights because they were free. As m uch as a  country’s freedom 
had to be protected, so did its rights, for w ithout those the country’s 
liberty would be abridged. Thus, Egypt had certain guaranteed rights 
because it was free.
Clearly one of those was protection against unw arranted  invasion. 
Any attack  on Egypt w ithout good cause - Eisenhower did not deem 
nationalization of the canal a rationale in itself - constituted a  disregard
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of N asser’s dominion and an immoral act. In addition, Eisenhower wrote
"The inherent right of any sovereign nation to exercise the power of
em inent domain within its own territory could scarcely be doubted...."13
N asser’s nationalization was legitimate in the President’s eyes, therefore,
he did not find any grounds for the allies’ attack.
Time magazine reported on August 13 th a t the Secretary of S tate 
had  voiced th is concept publicly. "Dulles took the position th a t Egypt as 
a  sovereign nation had a legal right to nationalize the Canal Company - 
an  Egyptian entity which he likened to a public utility with a  government 
charter - so long as Egypt paid due com pensation."14 Since Nasser 
promised to com pensate stock holders, his position becam e more 
tenable, in light of Dulles’ announcem ent. Although the Secretary of 
S tate also rem arked th a t taking control of the canal represented a 
violation of the 1888 Convention, this was in reference to limiting access 
to the canal. If N asser allowed all parties open access to the canal, 
nationalization could not be contested.
Herein lay the second tenet of Eisenhower’s guiding list: efficiency. 
For nearly 70 years, while the British and French controlled the Suez, 
canal traffic had sailed along smoothly, w ithout long term  delays or 
problems. Now N asser was in charge. Eisenhower believed th a t if 
N asser could m aintain the sam e level of productivity, there existed no 
rationale to reclaim the canal. He commented on A ugust 1 th a t the m ost
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important concern "is to make certain of the continued efficiency of this
great waterway...."15 As long as ships could sail through freely and
quickly, N asser’s action did not obstruct commerce. The guarantee of
passage for all ships, found in the 1888 Convention was satisfied. An
efficiently ru n  canal disputed allied claims th a t Egyptians were too
incom petent to m aintain the Suez. Their excuse for aggression
disintegrated.
Pondering th is idea as August opened, Eisenhower suggested th a t 
allowing Nasser to m aintain the canal was the best way to ensure he 
would not retain  it. The President told Dulles th a t "If we are right th a t 
th a t fellow can’t run  the Canal, there is bound to be a  breakdown in the 
Canal or he (Nasser) will commit aggression." Then the allies would have 
an  excuse to reassert control over the Canal. If G reat Britain and her 
com rades could not wait for such  a pretext, b u t insisted upon outright 
aggression, Eisenhower "was convinced th a t not only would they 
consolidate Arab force...[they also] would weaken and probably destroy 
the UN."16
It was no wonder the Eisenhower adm inistration objected to a 
m ilitary solution. The anticipated consequences were anathem a to 
America’s global objectives. Attack would strengthen N asser’s position 
as a  leader in the Middle E ast by increasing his prestige and respect 
am ong Arabs. In addition, if the W estern nations were to disregard a UN
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mandate, the door was opened to any other nation to do the same. The
global clout of the United Nations would be stripped away.
By November 1 the President’s confidence in Nasser’s ability to run  
the Canal had  increased. During an NSC meeting on th a t day he 
rem inded his advisor Governor S tassen th a t "transit through the Canal 
has increased ra ther than  decreased since the Egyptian take-over."17 
N asser m et and, to the chagrin of the British and the French, actually 
su rpassed  the efficiency criteria set by the United States. In his 
biography of Eisenhower, S tephen Ambrose noted th a t after Septem ber 
15, when the British pilots abandoned their posts, Egyptian and Greek 
captains piloted a record 254 ships through the canal in one w eek.18 
Egypt’s accom plishm ent could not easily be ignored. And, in 
Eisenhower’s eyes, the basis on which one could question nationalization 
was further reduced. N asser’s position was becoming increasingly solid.
Egyptian sovereignty and N asser’s ability to keep the Suez Canal 
running  smoothly were two of the factors which led Eisenhower to 
conclude th a t hostile action was not justified. These two factors, 
however, were not the only guides followed by the President. Eisenhower 
revealed another when he recited the third and "central principle" of 
those m entioned during his October news conference. It was probably 
with m any countries in mind th a t the President announced the principle 
th a t "the Canal could not be operated for the political purposes of any
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single country."19 Eisenhower’s statement harkened back to the Security
Council resolution passed ju s t before England and France began their
information blackout. Its origin m ost likely came from the Convention of
1888.
Article 12 of the Convention declared th a t the signatories applied 
"to the principle of equality as regards the free use of the canal....[and] 
agree th a t none of them  shall endeavour to obtain with respect to the 
canal territorial or commercial advantage or privilege in any 
international arrangem ents...."20 Although only commercial and 
territorial advantage specifically were prohibited, when either is gained, 
the resu lt is invariably political power.
Eisenhower’s statem ent could apply to m ost of the countries 
involved in the Suez Crisis. In one interpretation Eisenhower’s central 
principle could refer to Egypt. N asser’s nationalization of the canal 
potentially increased his ability to use the Suez Canal for his own 
advantage, commercially, territorially, and politically. Denying his 
enemies, primarily Israel, passage through the canal and increasing toll 
charges enlarged both Nasser’s profits and prestige in the Arab world. 
Such actions, if taken solely for Nasser’s own political power, violated the 
rules laid out in 1888. Eisenhower’s statem ent implied th a t the United 
S tates would not allow N asser to use the canal purely for his own 
purposes.
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The President’s declaration of the third principle also bore directly
on the British and French. When Great Britain and France attem pted to
regain control of the Suez, an  immediate alarm  about colonialism went
off in the highest levels of government. Officials worried th a t the Anglo-
French invasion was a 1956 version of colonialism.21
On November 1, 1956 Dulles analyzed the problem. During a
m orning NSC meeting Dulles presented the case th a t "basically we had
alm ost reached the point of deciding today w hether we th ink  the future
lies with a policy of reasserting by force colonial control over the less
developed nations, or w hether we will oppose such  a course of action by
every appropriate m eans."22 Opposition was the direction pu rsued  by
the adm inistration.
Although some historians support the idea th a t concern for
colonialism was a prim ary factor in the American government’s decision
to resist a forceful solution, this is improbable. There exists in
government records only scan t m ention of the fear of colonial
aspirations, suggesting colonialism was not actually a major influence on
Eisenhower. Still it is likely th a t the contemplation of colonialism had
some place in the adm inistration’s position th a t the canal rem ain free
from one country’s political purposes.
If colonial rule was reasserted over the Suez no one could
guarantee th a t the British a n d /o r  French would not use th a t position for
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political gain. In practice a colonial ruler subjugates its subordinate’s
desires to its own. Had the canal been dominated again by the British -
which was probable if N asser had  been defeated - a  single power could
control the Suez for its own political purposes.
Perhaps least apparent in Eisenhower’s sta tem ent was the way in 
which it could apply to the Soviet Union. Pre-em inent among 
Eisenhower’s concerns in the Middle E ast was Soviet influence and 
control in the area. During the fighting in Egypt the unknow n intentions 
of Russia constantly troubled top adm inistration officials. The President 
and  his advisors believed th a t if Russia m anaged to improve its standing 
with Nasser, Egypt would become a satellite of Communism. That, from 
the adm inistration’s perspective, might make the Suez susceptible to the 
control of the single power of Com m unist Russia. This was not only 
against Eisenhower’s Cold War beliefs, it also ran  counter to the 
convictions of m ost Americans.
The guiding precepts th a t Eisenhower publicly announced 
paralleled American beliefs and traditions. Sovereignty, efficiency, and 
an open door to the Suez all were practical US values translated  into 
in ternational term s. The philosophical background from whence these 
ideas were born was as old as the country itself. Also coming from the 
sam e origins as these standard  American traditions was a belief in the
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im portance of standing by one’s principles. This concept played an
im portant role in Eisenhower’s reaction to the crisis.
S trong in the President’s anti-aggression stance was his 
consideration of principles, particularly rem aining true to one’s promise. 
In 1950 America had signed the Tripartite Declaration, an  agreem ent 
th a t forbid military aggression in the Middle East. Eisenhower felt duty 
bound to uphold the agreement. He was concerned with keeping the 
word of the US in order to m aintain American credibility around the 
globe. A government’s credibility is dependent largely upon respecting 
internationally accepted morals and not breaking written agreem ents. At 
stake for the United S tates was m aintaining its reputation by rem aining 
faithful to the declaration.
In regard to this, the President was concerned with in ternational 
and domestic opinion of America’s reactions to unw arranted war in the 
Middle East. He knew th a t an attack on Egypt was immoral because 
there was no justification for it. To support an  attack  was to ignore right 
and wrong in the eyes of the whole world, as well as to disregard the 
United S ta tes’ proclaimed position. Nationally and globally, people did 
not accept force as a solution. Nasser had legal claims to the canal, 
there were no equivalent claims for a military solution.
As im portant was a second factor: rem aining loyal to his own 
personal beliefs. Eisenhower accepted war as a solution only when he
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could find absolutely no alternative. World War Two seemed to have left
the ex-general with a indelible loathing of battle. Consistently during
Eisenhower’s two term s, the President avoided violent exchanges in favor
of negotiated compromise. The only conflicts war ended were those
belonging to soldiers killed on the field. International dilemmas were
rarely resolved by fighting. When the prospect of hostilities arose
Eisenhower insisted th a t every alternative to battle be exhausted before
he accepted its necessity. That might m ean anything from conferences
to the th rea t of attack, b u t it did not imply actual hostilities. The
President could find m any alternatives short of war. In fact, during
Eisenhower’s eight years as president, he sen t no American soldier into
combat. Suez was no different. It was therefore because of both global
and personal principles th a t Eisenhower sought to uphold the Tripartite
Declaration.
On May 25, 1950 the United States, Great Britain, and France had 
signed the Tripartite Declaration pledging all three nations to work to 
avoid an arm s race in the Middle East. More importantly, from the 
President’s perspective, the proclamation took "this opportunity of 
declaring...deep in terest and...desire to promote the establishm ent and 
m aintenance of peace and stability in the area and unalterable 
opposition to the use of force or th rea t of force between any of the states 
in th a t area." In addition the docum ent stated th a t if the signatory
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governments discovered one country was preparing to attack  another
they would take actions "within and outside the United Nations, to
prevent such  violations."23 It was due to this proclamation, and
statem ents made during the Eisenhower’s tenure rededicating America
to peace in the Middle East, th a t the adm inistration railed against the
aggressive attacks against Egypt.
From one view point the British and French appeared to be 
upholding the doctrine by entering the foray when Israel attacked Egypt. 
Hostilities had broken out in the Middle E ast and they were taking 
actions "outside the United Nations to prevent such violations." Yet, 
within the UN, the French and British purposefully obstructed Security 
Council efforts to end the fighting. Besides this, the Eisenhower 
adm inistration already suspected the deception being played out by its 
allies. Britain and France adhered to the precepts of the Tripartite 
Declaration in form, bu t not in substance. The United S tates could not 
be party  to th a t aggression.
Knowing th a t the US could not participate in an  attack  on Nasser, 
the President asked the next logical question of his advisors. During an 
October 29 conference in the S tate Departm ent, he reviewed the 
situation and then wondered how the United States could justify  it 
support of N asser.24 The Chairm an of the Jo in t Chiefs of Staff, Admiral 
A rthur Radford voiced the answer Eisenhower already had  decided upon.
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Radford pointed out during the meeting "the matter must be
handled on the basis of principle...." Eisenhower added "he did not
fancy helping Egypt in the present circum stances b u t he felt our word
m ust be m ade good."25 Action was required and such  efforts could not
support England or France. Only by fulfilling the pledge made in the
Tripartite Declaration could the United S tates retain  its credibility
around the world, and Eisenhower m aintain his own peace-of-mind.26
As the S tate D epartm ent meeting continued Eisenhower and his
staff discussed their options. Although no final course was decided
upon, one step would be taken. Using w hat am ounted to a divide and
conquer tactic, Eisenhower suggested a note be sen t to Britain indicating
America’s intention to support Egypt. England could join the United
States in condemning hostilities against Egypt - th u s leaving France as
the sole supporter of Israeli aggression and creating even greater political
pressure to end the violence - or face the consequences. If the British
backed Israel and France "they may open a deep rift between us...."27
The implications of th a t split were left to the British imagination for the
time. Eisenhower’s blackmailing may have been subtle, b u t its in tent
was undoubtedly serious.
Although concerned about a "rift" forming between the United
States and Great Britain caused by the British inclination to use force,
Si
the President could not forgo his ideals. Only days after N asser
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nationalized the Suez Canal, the Secretary of Treasury, George M.
Humphrey, inquired about the results of such discord. Eisenhower
adm itted such  disagreem ent would be serious, "but," he added, "not as
serious as letting a war s ta rt and not trying to stop it."28 A w ar th a t was
avoidable was an inexcusable one.
On October 31, as Britain, France, and Israel attacked Egypt, 
Eisenhower delivered a speech condemning their aggression. Remaining 
faithful to his own principles of peaceful negotiation in lieu of violent 
altercation the President told America "In all the recent troubles in the 
Middle East, there have indeed been injuries suffered by all nations 
involved. But I do not believe th a t another instrum ent of injustice - 
w ar - is the remedy for these wrongs."29 There is no doubt Eisenhower 
was sincere in this sentim ent, publicly and behind closed doors.
Aggression solved no problems for the British and French, bu t 
served only to strengthen Nasser and his cause. Eisenhower complained 
th a t "If the British would agree to negotiate a settlem ent, then  the 
opinion of the whole world would be against Egypt."30 In th a t way, 
Britain and France could show th a t Nasser was unwilling to 
compromise. Only then  might the allies have justification for action 
against him. As it stood, Nasser was the victim and W estern Europe the 
villain. Eisenhower wanted his allies to consider the situation long 
enough to settle on a  m eans of reversing those roles. Brute force did not
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serve th a t purpose.
W hat also became clear to the President was th a t the W estern 
aggression in the Middle E ast had provided R ussia with a prime 
opportunity to increase its influence in th a t area. Besides the fear the 
Soviet Union would gain control over the Suez Canal, in evidence were 
the Cold War insecurities about Com m unist world domination. The 
allies’ attack  gave the Soviet Union the chance to denounce democracy 
and the West. It made for excellent m aterial in the ongoing an ti­
democracy propaganda campaign. R ussia actively sought ways to 
support the Arabs, while keeping the W estern image tarnished. 
Considering this information, there is no question th a t Eisenhower’s 
concern about the Soviet advance influenced his vehem ent rejection of 
unjustified aggression.
At the November first NSC conference already touched upon, 
Secretary Dulles raised the topic of the Soviet Union and the Middle 
East. He w arned th a t if the United S tates did not take the initiative 
soon, the Soviet Union would seek an end to hostilities, and gain 
dom inance in the Middle E ast.31 Dulles continued by recom mending 
th a t the United S tates be sure to propose a resolution in the UN before 
the Soviet Union did so. Any other scenario gave R ussia the propaganda 
advantage as well as m ade America a  follower, instead of a  leader. Also, 
a  Soviet resolution was bound to label Britain and France as
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aggressors.32 Although Eisenhower and Dulles might feel th a t way
privately, publicly such  tags gave the West a poor image. An American
resolution would avoid the stigma of titles by calling for a universal
cease-fire and UN peace-keeping forces.
To allow the R ussians any say in the Middle E ast was to give them  
influence in th a t area. The US had to pass its resolution before their 
rivals could act. American UN representative Heniy Cabot Lodge Jr., did 
so, and received rousing acclaim from countries around the world, for 
his effort.
On November 5 the situation in regards to the Soviet Union 
became even more complicated. That evening President Eisenhower 
received a note from Soviet Head of Government Nikolai A. Bulganin. 
Bulganin proposed a Russo-American military venture to bring the 
Middle E astern  com batants into line. The Russian official stated  th a t 
the USSR was prepared to lend air support and naval power to the 
Egyptian cause, if the Western nations did not halt their onslaught.33
To th is partnership  Eisenhower answered a definite no. Great 
Britain and France had circumvented American attem pts at peace, yet 
despite this they rem ained the prim ary allies of the United States. 
America would not join with its chief rival in military operations against 
either country.
The R ussians followed their offer to the US with threatening notes
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sen t to London and Paris. These com m unications carried an ominous
Soviet warning. The R ussians threatened to launch ballistic missiles a t
Britain and France if the two belligerents did not desist.34
In the United S tates government, these warnings, although awful if 
fulfilled, were m et generally with disbelief. Eisenhower, in his memoirs, 
recalled Chairm an of the JCS Radford’s reaction to the Soviet warning. 
The Admiral rem arked, "’It is very hard  to figure out the R ussian 
thinking in connection with their proposal. For them  to attem pt any 
operation in the Middle E ast would be extremely difficult, militarily. The 
only reasonable form of intervention would be long-range air strikes with 
nuclear weapons - which seems unlikely.’"35 The Soviet’s would not 
begin World War Three ju s t for propaganda. In top government circles 
the th rea ts were interpreted as bluffs.
Soviet intervention was largely discounted, since it was nearly 
impossible to accomplish. As a precaution and an American counter- 
w arning to show the Soviets th a t the United S tates would not tolerate 
any aggression from them, Eisenhower mobilized US forces around the 
world. This action was a product of Eisenhower’s cautious nature, not of 
fear th a t the USSR would actually follow through on its th rea ts .36 The 
President always kept open as m any of his options as possible. World 
War Three was not likely to begin, b u t Eisenhower wanted to be 
prepared on the off chance something went horribly wrong. And, he was
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prepared.
Charles Bohlen, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, informed the 
Eisenhower adm inistration th a t the Russians had  not intended the US to 
accept their offer, bu t had proposed the plan as a  diversionary tactic. 
They wished to avoid drawing unw anted attention to events in the Soviet 
satellite country of Hungary.37 As it turned  out, because of the situation 
in the Middle East, the United States was for the m ost part preoccupied 
anyway. Although concerned with the situation in Hungary, America 
had  few options open to it and m ustered no more th an  weak public 
denunciations of Soviet actions.
On October 22 the people of Hungary revolted against their 
S talinist rulers. For two weeks the situation appeared promising. 
President Eisenhower began his October 31 televised speech with 
com m ents about the country. He was optimistic th a t a new, free 
H ungary was coming of age. The Soviet Union had  "declared its 
readiness to consider the withdrawal of Soviet ’advisors....’"38 For a 
m om ent the th rea t of world Com m unist domination seemed to subside. 
The hope survived only another four days.
Soviet military forces attacked Hungary on November 4 crushing 
the rebellion and providing a horrific example for all other E astern  
European freedom fighters.39 The following day Deputy Under Secretary 
of S tate for Political Affairs, Robert D. Murphy, reiterated Am bassador
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Bohlen’s conclusion. He expressed the opinion that Soviet calls for a
jo int action by US and USSR in Egypt were designed to draw attention
away from events in Hungary.40 Bohlen’s interpretation became the
standard  one.
The greatest difficulty resulting from the Soviet invasion of 
H ungary was not due to Russian actions, b u t to the previous attacks 
m ade by England, France, and Israel. Their joint efforts to regain control 
of the Suez Canal represented unjustifiable aggression. R ussia’s 
movements against Hungary fell into the sam e category. Both E ast and 
West were ignoring world opinion in order to obtain their objectives.
How then, could the W estern world condemn Soviet forces in H ungary 
and not appear hypocritical? Members of the W estern com m unity were 
committing immoral acts th a t appeared similar to R ussia’s atrocities. 
Moreover Britain and France had begun their aggression before the 
USSR had.
There was little the United S tates could do in Hungary. A 
propaganda bonanza was impossible given the circum stances since US 
resources already were diverted by the Suez Crisis and such  a  severe 
blitz would m ake America appear hypocritical, had one ju s t as 
uncom prom ising not been directed toward the allies. Eisenhower also 
adm itted th a t US intervention was an impossibility because troops could 
not reach Hungary w ithout crossing neutral territory.41 All the President
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could do was send America’s forlorn hope: "The heart of America goes
out to the people of Hungary...." - a nice sentim ent, b u t ineffective.42
Circum stances in Egypt did serve to divert attention away from 
Hungary. This gave the Soviets free reign in th a t area, w ithout an 
American recourse. Instead of facing a trem endous propaganda 
campaign brought on by their attack, the Soviet Union received little 
criticism. W hat official rebuke th a t was offered came in the form of a 
United Nations resolution condemning their aggression, b u t offering no 
way to halt the destruction in Hungary.
In addition, the attack  on Egypt by England and France mocked 
W estern nations’ traditional stdnce against taking such  a course to settle 
disputes. The free world might expect Russia to brutally  crush  its 
opposition, bu t Great Britain and France were supposed to be "civilized." 
It was possible to conclude th a t Anglo-French aggression gave the 
Soviets an excuse to use force. All Russia needed to do was look across 
the continent a t w hat its neighbors were doing. If England and France 
could commit immoral attacks, why not the USSR?
The Russian attack  on Hungary fueled Eisenhower’s desire to 
guarantee th a t Soviet influence rem ain a t a m inim um  in the Middle 
East. On November 6, the sam e day Eden informed the President th a t 
Great Britain would abide by the cease-fire, Eisenhower sen t a note to 
Eden. The American leader proposed three factors be included in the
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United Nations cease-fire. First, there could be no conditions set on the
UN cease-fire "so as to not give Egypt with Soviet backing an  opportunity
to quibble or s ta rt negotiations...[those] can be handled later." Second,
the President stated  th a t the peace-keeping force introduced into the
Suez area should exclude troops from any of the big five nations - US,
UK, USSR, France, and Peoples Republic of China. In this way "no
excuse [would] be given for Soviet participation in UN force...." Third, the
UN plan should be implemented as soon as possible to avoid further
confusion and developments.43 The President w anted to draw the crisis
to a  close and ensure Russia did not slip in before the gate was locked.
Eisenhower’s effort to keep Soviet influence out of the Middle E ast 
was a m ain consideration in deciding w hat course to chose during the 
Suez Canal Crisis. Along with this motivation was his desire to honor 
the sovereignty of Egypt, m aintain the efficiency of the canal, and rem ain 
true to all the principles involved. There have been, besides the 
explanations outlined here, several others offered for why Eisenhower 
reacted as he did. These theories propose less hum anitarian  - and less 
probable - motivations for America’s adam ant anti-aggression stance 
against England and France.
Herbert Parmet, au thor of Eisenhower and the American C rusades 
and Blanche Wiesen Cook, who wrote The Declassified Eisenhower, 
m aintained th a t it was not principle, bu t election time worries th a t
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caused Eisenhower to react with such  anger. On the eve of the national
vote England and France had launched an immoral attack. Not only did
it reflect poorly on the image of the West, it also increased pressures and
responsibilities for Eisenhower, who already was dealing with a  hectic
campaigning schedule. Parm et and Cook concluded Eisenhower took
the attack  as a  personal insult and responded vindictively.44
Blanche Cook added the questionable theoiy th a t Eisenhower 
sided with N asser because "reliable sources" deemed the Egyptian leader 
"an agreeable business partner...."45 Given N asser’s previous business 
dealings with the United S tates - the Aswan Dam and requested arm s - 
even had  businessm en informed Eisenhower of their sentim ent, it seems 
improbable th a t Eisenhower or the S tate D epartm ent would agree with 
it. By all evidence collected, N asser appeared to be a m anipulative 
business associate, not a  trustw orthy one.
The m ost convincing of the argum ents connecting the President’s 
reaction and the national election came from Michael Guhin. Guhin pu t 
an  intriguing tw ist on the theory th a t Eisenhower’s reaction was related 
to the election. The au thor noted th a t given the close proximity of the 
upcom ing election and the Middle E ast War, the President would be 
inclined to react in some way. "No comment" would have appeared as 
either acceptance of the Anglo-French position or as indecision. Neither 
gave the American people a good im pression of Eisenhower.46 Guhin
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concluded th a t the President’s response to the conflict was consistent
with his in terest in staying in office. The explanation avoided the image
of Eisenhower as vengeful archetype. He was portrayed as a careful
strategist in this model.
Although the above argum ent has a logical, persuasive line of 
reasoning to it - and is certainly well considered - the theory’s validity, 
as with Cook’s and Parm et’s, is improbable. Eisenhower neither 
responded to the Suez Crisis out of spite because his campaign was 
interrupted, nor as a tactic to m aintain a  healthy image as the election 
approached. As accurately as can be determined, Eisenhower rem ained 
unconcerned with his reelection from the beginning of the crisis.
In fact, Eisenhower had revealed the lack of im portance he placed 
on the election to him self and his advisors long before hostilities broke 
out in the Middle East. Writing in his diaiy on October 15, 1956 
Eisenhower reviewed the situation as it stood then. He sum m arized the 
American belief th a t Israel had begun a m ilitaiy mobilization.
Considering th a t the Prime M inister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, might 
believe Eisenhower would not stand  against Israeli aggression because of 
the Jewish vote in the United States, Eisenhower wrote the warning:
"Ben Gurion should not make any grave m istakes based upon his belief 
th a t winning a  domestic election [the presidency] is as im portant to us 
as preserving and protecting the interests of the United Nations and
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other nations of the free world in th a t region."47 If need be, Eisenhower
had decided he would sacrifice him self to keep the peace.
Eisenhower’s devotion to a cease-fire a t the possible cost of his job 
was made apparent to some of his close advisors during a meeting in the 
White House on October 29. While contemplating the Israeli a ttack  on 
Egypt and possible Anglo-French collusion with the Jew ish State, 
Eisenhower’s comments about whatever action the US took and his 
prospects for a  second term  were recorded. "The President said, in this 
m atter, he does not care in the slightest w hether he is re-elected or not. 
He feels we m ust m ake good on our word. He added th a t he does not 
really th ink  the American people would throw him out in the m idst of a 
situation like this, bu t if they did, so be it."48 Eisenhower did not bother 
with the topic of elections, it was far outweighed by the im portance of 
the Suez Crisis. And, in the end, he was returned to his office by a wide 
margin.
Finally, when Anthony Eden called Eisenhower on election day to 
announce th a t the United Kingdom would accept a  UN cease-fire, Eden 
politely asked how the presidential election was going. Eisenhower’s 
response was simply, "I don’t give a darn about the election."49 He was 
not concerned with the results of th a t political gambit. The President’s 
thoughts rem ained focused on attaining peace in the Middle East.
Another explanation for Eisenhower’s reaction to the British-
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French-Israeli operation concerns the Anglo-French news blackout
beginning in the second week of October. From October 15 - when an
American reconnaissance aircraft recorded the existence of 60 Mystere
planes in Israel, instead of the twelve officially there -Eisenhower wrote
"we had the uneasy feeling th a t we were cut off from our allies."50 The
President’s assessm ent was correct. The question th a t some ask  is
w hether or not this intentional effort to keep information from the United
States resulted in a deep resentm ent in American quarters.51
A com m ent made by Secretary of S tate Dulles during a  National 
Security meeting discredits this theoiy. Speaking to the NSC members 
Dulles noted th a t Great Britain and France had acted contrary to US 
advice and also had ignored w hat was in their best interests. In spite of 
these facts, he added, "Of course, we should not let ourselves be swayed 
by resentm ent a t the treatm ent the British and French have given us, or 
do anything except w hat we decide is the right thing to do."52 Here is a 
straight forward statem ent. W hether or not the US was angry with the 
Anglo-French actions, America should not react out of malice.
The final proof th a t Eisenhower’s reaction represented w hat he 
believed morality called for, ra ther than  spite, is found in his response to 
the im plementation of the cease-fire. After Eisenhower received word on 
November 6 th a t Eden would accept the cease-fire, the President called 
his counter-part to say "I can’t tell you how pleased we are th a t you
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found it possible to accept the cease-fire...."53 It was a som ewhat ironic
statem ent since the US had forced Britain’s acquiescence.54
Eisenhower probably did not register the irony in his own
statem ent. Most likely, he was genuinely pleased th a t the fighting was
a t an  end. His actions after November 6 displayed no residual
resentm ent about the events of Suez and he moved to erase all discord
as quickly as possible.
Around quarter to nine the following m orning Eisenhower received
a  phone call from Anthony Eden. During the course of the conversation
Eden and Eisenhower agreed th a t Eden and French Prime M inister
/
Mollet should visit the United S tates th a t Friday and Saturday  - only two 
days away. The President commented, "’after all, it is like a family spa t.’" 
Eden agreed to inform Mollet of the plan and Eisenhower ensured him  
an  invitation from America would be dispatched to Mollet immediately.
At 9:10 one of Eden’s aides called back to state th a t Mollet was delighted 
to accept and asked th a t all three governments announce the visit 
sim ultaneously - 11 a.m. in the W ashington D.C., 4 p.m. in London, 
and  5 p.m. in Paris.55 The President had made light of events in the 
Suez, so as to minimize the split th a t had recently occurred between 
W estern Europe and the United States.
Eisenhower’s plans were dampened, however, when he consulted 
with Dulles (still in the hospital), Herbert Hoover, Jr., and George
STANDING AGAINST THE ALLIES -  1 1 0  -
Humphrey. These three vetoed the idea of a meeting that weekend.56
Definitely uncom fortable with his task, Eisenhower now had to rescind
his invitation to the British and French.
Thirty-three m inutes before Eisenhower was supposed to 
announce the visit, he called Eden to postpone it. He began directly by 
telling Eden the visit could not occur as planned. "I have ju s t  had  a 
partial Cabinet meeting on this thing, & [sic] they th ink  our tim ing is 
very, very bad...." The President proceeded to relay several reasons why 
his cabinet m em bers had vetoed the meeting.
First off, he explained the United S tates had not prepared for w hat 
am ounted to a sum m it conference. There rem ained m uch to study  
about the situation in Egypt - politically and militarily - before one could 
occur. Besides this the Democrats had  won both houses of Congress the 
previous night and "I have to have the Senate and House leaders in right 
now. We have already issued invitation. They are to be here Friday and 
Saturday, and I have to be meeting with them."57
Eisenhower’s disappointm ent came through even in the transcrip t 
of his conversation. Even with logical explanations to support his 
argum ent, Eisenhower was d istraught th a t the visit could not happen.
He apologized to Eden saying "I do believe, in view of w hat my people 
say, we will have to postpone it a little bit. I am  soriy....I am  really soriy 
because, as I told you th is morning, I w ant to talk  with you [emphasis
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original]." Eden tried to find out when would be a good time, but
Eisenhower deferred, explaining th a t he needed to have a full Cabinet
m eeting before he could answer th a t question. Eventually, Eisenhower
stated  th a t he would call back in the evening with a  time. The
conversation ended there.58 The President and his NATO allies
eventually would meet, b u t it was not to be for some time yet.
On November 7 the Soviet Union offered to send R ussian 
volunteers to reinforce Egyptian troops.59 Dulles believed it was 
improbable the Russians would act on their threat, b u t th a t they hoped 
the offer would unbalance the situation in Egypt, and disturb  the cease­
fire. As far as the Secretary of S tate was concerned, w hat the Soviets 
w anted was a bigger hand  in the cookie ja r .60 In the end, nothing came 
of the R ussian declaration. Nasser refused their offer w ithout 
hesitation.61 Undoubtedly the Egyptian leader opposed yet another 
foreign government peddling its doctrine in his land. Besides, Nasser 
had  achieved his goals and therefore had  no reason to continue the fight. 
The canal would be returned to Egypt and Nasser’s power among Arabs 
had  increased. Despite Soviet efforts, the cease-fire held.
For all intents and purposes the crisis was over once the cease-fire 
went into effect. All th a t rem ained was clean up  details. To the 
disappointm ent of the President events had run  the course he m ost 
feared, b u t had originally anticipated. The French and British did not
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exhaust all possible avenues before resorting to military action.
Eisenhower saw no recourse b u t to force Britain and France to end their
unjustifiable attack. Thus, N asser was not dislodged, his power not
diffused. The W estern allies were cast as aggressors instead of saviors.
Although America was hailed by sm aller nations for its cease fire
initiative in the UN, the price for such praise was a distorted image of
the united W estern front and the abhorrent implication th a t America
had sided with the Com munists. The Soviet Union was given the chance
to play the role of White Knight to its utm ost ability. The crisis ended in
a  victoiy for N asser and a propaganda sensation for Russia.
From the beginning Eisenhower was aware of the potential 
dangers an attack on Nasser might bring. Four days after the 
nationalization he told his advisors "Nasser embodies the emotional 
dem ands of the people of the area for independence and for ’slapping 
down the white m an.’"62 O utright opposition to the Egyptian leader was 
sure to rouse antipathy from the rest of the Arab community. Unless 
the Suez situation could be defused w ithout use of force, N asser would 
gain and the allies lose. There was no justification for an  assau lt and 
th a t was clear to everyone except those attacking.
The President steadfastly refused to accept war as the m eans of 
reversing nationalization. Supporting this allied response was not only 
immoral, it was counterproductive. America’s credibility would suffer
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along'with a loss of respect from third world countries.
Once the violence began, Eisenhower did everything in his power 
to p u t a stop to it. He publicly denounced Britain’s aggression and 
worked to empty the British treasury  - in short, bringing the UK to the 
verge of bankruptcy to ensure their cooperation. When Eden could no 
longer susta in  the attack, France had no choice bu t to halt also.
One thing m ust be clearly understood. United S tates pressure, 
not R ussian threats, forced an end to the aggression. The Soviet offers 
of air force, navy, and troops may have seemed unnerving to the general 
public, bu t inside the White House, adm inistration members did not 
harp  on them. The Soviet Union would not risk annihilation in an effort 
to convert Egypt, especially considering th a t Nasser had spent the prior 
year playing the United States and R ussia against one another.
The actions Eisenhower took were successful in ending the crisis. 
Conveniently, the ramifications of the adm inistration’s opposition to 
British, French, and Israeli hostilities were beneficial too. Michael Guhin 
provides an excellent explanation of the practical advantages resulting in 
Eisenhower’s anti-aggression stance.
First, it allowed America to "counter any Soviet designs or th reats 
over the Suez." By condemning the attacks on Egypt, the US rem ained in 
a position to work toward peace w ithout joining Soviet efforts. This 
m aintained the United S tates in good standing with the rest of the world,
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while minimizing the positive appearance of Soviet efforts at peace.
In addition, Guhin noted once the USSR assaulted  Hungary, the 
United S tates had the opportunity to condemn their aggression also.
Had America upheld the allies’ decision to fight, it would have appeared 
hypocritical to reprobate the Soviet action - in essence a  "do as I say, not 
as I do" stance. The United States could reproach all com batants 
justifiably because it consistently stood against force.63
In his article, "Eden" Robert Rhodes Jam es wrote "Eisenhower was 
consistent th a t the canal was not worth a war. Eden was consistent th a t 
it was...."64 Stated a t this basic level, all the reactions to the crisis are 
clear. W estern Europe and the United S tates stood a t opposite ends of 
the spectrum . There was bound to be disagreem ent and strife among 
the allies. When it arrived Eisenhower reverted to w hat might be 
referred to as his command mode. He did as any good m ilitaiy officer is 
trained to do - he did w hat was necessary in the situation. And, in th a t 
instance, an  end to the fighting was required.
The President was not motivated by spite or revenge. He was 
concerned with America’s credibility and world opinion. It seems 
apparent, however, th a t the strongest influence guiding his reaction was 
related to the justiciability - in Eisenhower’s mind - of the acts 
committed by the British, French, and Israelis.
Had the US considered an attack necessary, it is probable the
STANDING AGAINST THE ALLIES -  1 1 5  -
administration would have discovered a way around the Tripartite
Declaration, and any other obstacles, in order to assist the aggressors.
The United S tates had created justifications for acts deemed immoral by
American citizens and foreign governments before this and has since
done so. The only conclusion th a t can be drawn is th a t Eisenhower did
not believe the Suez Canal w arranted forceful assertion. There were
m eans short of war th a t might result in a  satisfactory resolution. No
advantage could be gained in the Middle E ast or over the Soviet Union
by resorting to force. In short, violence was resisted to avoid
endangering the West’s position in the global arena.
Despite US opposition to the aggression, President Eisenhower 
believed th a t the relationship with England, France, and Israel would 
heal quickly. He wished to repair any damage caused by the crisis as 
soon as he was able and worked toward th a t end. Following the 
implem entation of the cease-fire, com munications between the United 
S tates and British and French officials took on an amicable, if somewhat 
apprehensive, tone. Although discussion with Israel’s Prime M inister 
Ben-Gurion was less pleasant, it was not hostile. In all cases, however, 
apprehensions were directed toward the Russian menace. America as 
well as the conspirators were concerned with Soviet intentions in the 
Middle E ast.65 The allies had reverted to their m utual obsession with 
Cold War considerations. Details of the final settlem ent still had to be
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arranged, but for all intents and purposes the allies were reunited.66
After the crisis had passed N asser complied with all the 
resolutions called for by the United S tates and the UN, from arbitration 
and development funds to minimal toll increases.67 Having achieved his 
goal, control of the Suez Canal, he had no desire to further irritate the 
world. His in ten t from the s ta rt had been to remove foreign influence 
from Egypt, never to d isrupt passage through the Suez. Limiting access 
to the canal would only create resentm ent among the canal users and 
provide an  excuse to oppose nationalization. With no such rationale the 
British and French had m iscalculated and acted w ithout appropriate 
cause. N asser’s advantage was th a t the rest of the world considered him  
innocent. As the crisis concluded, Nasser was careful to m aintain th a t
fadvantage.
At last we come full circle in this chapter to address the question 
of President Eisenhower’s "furious" response to the Anglo-French 
aggression. It is certain th a t the President took h arsh  m easures to 
pressure England, France, and Israel to end hostilities. It is also clear 
th a t he was not motivated by spite or revenge. Rather, Eisenhower’s 
angiy reaction can best be explained as one of outrage. Outrage a t the 
Anglo-French disregard for m odern standards of civilization.
Eisenhower felt disbelief th a t his NATO allies were weakening the 
position of the West and enhancing the Soviet image. He was alarm ed
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by the fact that British and French action endangered the power of the
United Nations. Lastly, the President could not agree to w hat am ounted
to a breach of contract - ignoring the Tripartite Declaration.
Simply stated, Eisenhower believed the British and French were 
wrong in their desires, reasoning, and action. It was not a personal 
vendetta for him, except with respect to the fact th a t he was morally 
against their aggression. Eisenhower believed th a t he, as President of 
the United S tates, had  an obligation to stop the W estern Allies. Their 
aggressive policy disregarded American and international moral 
consideration, leaving Eisenhower - the leader of the free world - no
choice b u t to p u t a halt to their attack.
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CHAPTER FIVE
S u e z  C o n c l u d e d
The negotiation, conversation, and occupation of the canal zone 
continued through December. ^Eventually all forces retreated from their 
positions and the Suez Canal was cleared of scuttled ships. The 
business of sailing the Suez resum ed, b u t now under the direction of 
Egyph Egyptian troops received a h arsh  defeat, yet N asser was never 
more powerful. Politically his image had been enhanced. He had beaten 
France and England by m aintaining control over the canal. A New 
Republic editor predicted on Septem ber 17 th a t after all the talks were 
complete N asser would still "save both face and the Canal."1 After the 
conferences and the fighting were done, the com ment proved correct on 
both counts. Arab nationalism  was a t a high m ark and stayed there for 
over a decade.
Some thought the roots of this conflict could be found in the offer 
of the United States, IBRD, and Great Britain to finance the Aswan Dam 
and its subsequent ab rup t withdrawal. Nasser staked his legitimacy in 
the Arab world on completing the project. But, he could not help trying
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to p ressure his American partners into sweetening the deal for Egypt by
dallying with the Eastern  block, dom inated by America’s nem esis, the
Soviet Union.
When N asser could not obtain weapons from the West, he 
purchased  Czech arm s. Against America’s wishes, he also recognized 
China. And, to add to the insult, the Egyptian President planned a visit 
to Moscow. American diplomats indirectly warned Nasser th a t his 
actions would result in repercussions. Congressional support for the 
Aswan project evaporated further with each anti-American act 
committed by Egypt. Public opinion also tu rned  against Nasser. When 
the Egyptian leader did not reverse his course, Dulles withdrew the offer 
to build the Aswan Dam. Six days later Nasser nationalized the Suez 
Canal. Was this an angiy reaction to the sudden withdraw or a  
calculated m easure to increase Egypt’s power?
It is probable th a t N asser anticipated the withdrawal of Aswan aid. 
It is possible also he expected to nationalize the canal in response. 
Certainly, Egypt’s leader took full advantage of the situation Dulles had  
created in cancelling the program in w hat appeared to be an  ab rup t 
m anner. His indignant response reached sym pathetic ears in m any 
sm all countries. A Gallup poll'asked citizens of several countries 
w hether they approved or disapproved of the retaliatory actions taken by 
Israel, Britain, and France. The results showed overwhelming
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disapproval of the assau lt.2 N asser’s well acted denunciation of aid
cancellation gained him  support from around the world. The aggressors
received no more th an  scorn.
It is alm ost certain th a t nationalization of the Suez Canal was not
directly related to withdrawal of Aswan Dam aid. Peter Woodward,
au thor of N asser in the "Profiles in Power" series, noted th a t N asser
%
continued to nationalize industries and businesses in Egypt during the 
fifteen years following the Suez Crisis. Nasser believed it necessary to 
remove outside influences in Egypt to increase profit and Arab 
nationalism . Newspapers, banks, insurance companies, public 
transportation, hotels, and movie theaters all were sta te  controlled by 
1965. Before economic troubles forced N asser to slow his 
nationalization trend over 600 businesses were seized.3
N asser’s move to control the Suez represented only his first step in 
nationalization. Egypt’s seizure of the canal was not truly a retaliatory 
action. Dulles had simply provided a convenient excuse for something 
Nasser planned to do anyway. Although the Aswan Dam was im portant, 
America’s cancellation of aid did not prompt nationalization. It provided 
a cover for w hat Egypt’s leader intended no m atter what.
In October, 1956 N asser adm itted th a t he had been planning to 
take control of the canal since 1954. Nasser did not mention th a t until 
June , 1956 it had been impossible to do so because of the British
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occupation troops stationed on the banks of the Suez. Due to US
pressure, Great Britain had agreed to evacuate their soldiers. Because
of Dulles’ diplomatic blunder, Egypt had an excuse to fill the vacuum
created when the British left.
In one way, the Suez Canal Crisis was a continuation of the 
political scram ble for power in the Middle E ast th a t had begun even 
before 1955. Prior to the crisis N asser had  tried to play the United 
S tates against the Soviet Union in order to gain the best of both E astern  
and W estern worlds. At the sam e time, he wanted to rem ain free from 
the overarching grasp of either super power. Conversely, both America 
and R ussia had attem pted to gain power in the Middle E ast by 
m anipulating Nasser. As the crisis began the situation rem ained the 
same.
America continued to try  to be N asser’s friend. Although the UK 
and  France believed America wowld accept their assau lt as a  fait 
accompli and lend support to the attack, Eisenhower rem ained true  to 
the Tripartite Declaration. In effect, he supported N asser’s legitimacy 
over th a t of his allies. His reasons, as we have seen were varied and 
extensive, b u t the end result was to defend Egypt’s position. This could 
not help b u t make the United S tates more appealing to Nasser. By 
opposing Britain, France, and Israel, Eisenhower basically ensured 
N asser’s nationalization retained its validity. If th a t did not resu lt in
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some appreciation from the Egyptian government, w hat would?
In the typical Russian way, the Soviet Union rem ained steadfast 
N asser supporter also. Always upholding "nationalist" movements 
(outside of Eastern  Europe), the USSR could hardly ignore Nasser. 
During the crisis Russia offered military assistance to Egypt in an  effort 
to gain influence in the Middle East. Since Nasser’s anti-w est position 
m eshed well with the Soviet stance, the R ussians were bound try to 
bring N asser into their sphere. To the annoyance of the Russians, 
however, N asser refused to kowtow to his Com m unist benefactors.
In fact, Nasser would allow no influence to seep in from either 
nation. He sought a resolution to the Suez Canal Crisis th a t best served 
his brand of nationalism . He continued to work for the betterm ent of 
Egypt and avoided any obligations to the superpowers.
Nasser’s contact with the Soviet Union increased after the crisis 
was resolved, bu t he never committed Egypt to the ham m er and sickle. 
During the following years vitriolic doctrinal disagreem ents between 
N asser and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet 
Com m unist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, repeatedly occurred with no 
agreem ent being reached.4 In the decade and a half following the canal 
incident Nasser accepted m uch aid from the Soviet Union, b u t little 
advice.
Egyptian relations with the United S tates did not even attain  the
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Soviet level. N asser m aintained  ^ lis anti-Israel/anti-W estern stance
m aking norm al political association nearly impossible. Although the
Egyptian President never closed the door to offers of economic
assistance, he also was hard  pressed to accept any th a t came with
strings attached. US aid packages invariably did so.
The US’s and the Soviet Union’s in terest in Nasser was explained 
by the fact th a t his power and popularity were clearly the greatest in the 
area. Yet, the Egyptian President’s power was one with its basis in Arab 
nationalism . The US/USSR goal of increasing foreign influence in the 
Middle E ast and N asser’s desire to consolidate Arabian support around 
Egypt were contradictory. N asser could not m aintain his independence 
of action or position in the Arab com munity while a superpower’s 
doctrine was evident. America atnd Russia were destined to have 
minimal influence in Egypt, no m atter w hat tactics they applied.
The crisis in regards to Britain and France had a  negative 
outcome. As a direct result of the Suez conflict, the predom inant 
position of the United S tates in the West was fully revealed. Great 
Britain’s reliance on the United S tates was not questioned again during 
the Eisenhower adm inistration. Although France - under Charles de 
Gaulle’s influence - would attem pt to reassert its independence in the 
future, the only resu lt was isolation from America, not leadership in 
Europe. The Suez Crisis had illustrated America’s ability to force its will
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upon the rest of the Western world.
In Israel the short war had a positive effect. Although Israel 
cooperated with Anglo-French forces, its goals differed from the British 
and French. Ben-Gurion had perceived the military action as a 
preventive m easure. A m eans designed to show sim ultaneously Israel’s 
strength, avoid high casualties, and warn the Arabs against attack, 
w ithout starting  a major war. The ease with which Israeli troops 
advanced against Egyptian soldiers served as a clear lesson to Israel’s 
enemies. Attacking the Jew ish state was a  poor idea.5
Of the participants in th s  Suez Crisis only the United S tates and 
the Soviet Union did not suffer some type of defeat. G reat Britain and 
France lost control of the canal. Israel, although it m ight have preferred 
to keep the Sinai territory won in battle, bargained it away in favor of the 
clear passage through the Tiran Straights. And, Egyptian forces were 
undeniably trounced by Israel’s army. It would be another decade before 
N asser dared attack Israel.
The superpowers, on the other hand, were free from loss. Their 
overall situations rem ained unchanged. Both the United S tates and the 
Soviet Union continued their ongoing efforts to gain advantages over the 
other. Suez might have been interpreted as a victory for the Com m unist 
cause, since Russian relations with Nasser were increased. If th a t were 
the case, the Soviet’s had trium phed in only a single battle. O ther areas
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of the globe rem ained to be won. Besides, N asser continued to steer an
independent course from the Soviet Union, so their victory was not so
sweet, after all.
The Cold War was far from finished. Neither superpower had 
expanded its vision of the world to include or accept as im portant the 
independence of third world countries. America and Russia both 
continued to regard each other as the players and consign everyone else 
the part of pawns.
Most tragic for the UnitedJStates was th a t it did not learn during 
Suez a lesson th a t would have saved American lives and hearts a  decade 
later. Although Eisenhower had supported the nationalistically inspired 
Nasser, protecting Egypt against efforts to destroy it, he failed to 
acknowledge the credibility of Egyptian nationalism . Eisenhower 
disregarded the nationalist element of N asser’s position and 
concentrated only on the legitimacy of his action. Perhaps had  the 
United S tates analyzed the situation, it could have learned to view 
nationalist movements as products of internal expressions, and not 
external influences. Had th a t been seen, or even accepted as a  valid 
possibility when analyzing other cases of nationalistic fervor, the United 
S tates might have been able to avoid the Vietnam War.
Clearly the chance would have been minimal. It is improbable 
America would have discounted the Com m unist doctrine of Ho Chi Mihn
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and viewed him purely as a  nationalist. Although N asser had
nationalized the canal and hundreds of businesses after tha t, he avoided
Com m unist rhetoric. Ho, also referred to national unity, b u t Americans
could not ignore his connection to Communism. Americans did not
recognize th a t Ho Chi Mihn’s power found its basis in the sam e place as
N asser’s, in the people.
Undoubtedly, it is wishful thinking to say th a t the United S tates 
could have been led by less prejudicial leaders. In th a t period, Cold War 
considerations were ingrained in American society and psyche. The 
Soviet Union was the enemy, and Communism the disease it spread. 
Eisenhower believed that, as did Dulles. Yet, tem pering his fear of 
Com munism was an overriding desire for peace. Because of 
Eisenhower’s particular philosophy, the President resisted the Cold War 
inclination to support the allies against a potential R ussian advance. 
Instead Eisenhower steered a course m andated by principles. Through 
careful tactics the President m anaged to find a way to protect against 
undue Soviet intervention in the Middle E ast w ithout allying with the 
aggressors.
Eisenhower’s policy preserved the peace and denied Soviet 
advances. It was a  com bination th a t proved difficult to achieve in the 
adm inistrations following E is e n h o w e r ’s .  In fact, it was a  combination 
rarely, if a t all, seen since.
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